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I. INTRODUCTION
In 201o, Toyota issued recalls on over eight million vehicles because of
faulty acceleration.' As a result, several government agencies and Congress
are requesting information about Toyota's safety problems, and even the
SEC is interested in Toyota's disclosure practices related to the unintended
acceleration in its vehicles. 2 Assume that a device of potential interest to the
government is the event data recorder (commonly known as a "black box")
that Toyota has installed in its vehicles. This device, similar to the black box
on an airplane, can measure and record a wide range of electronic
information about the vehicle and the driver's interaction with it.3 Assume
further that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA")
requests that Toyota allow the government access to the data in black boxes
on the recalled vehicles.4 The black boxes are operated by proprietary
software, and the information recorded on them can only be accessed with
special laptops held by Toyota.5
Assume that Toyota refuses to provide the government with the black
box data, claiming that it would reveal its trade secrets and proprietary
information. 6 How should a court decide whether to compel Toyota to
produce the black box data? How does a court achieve the proper balance
between the public benefit resulting from disclosure7 to the government
and the potential harm to the company if its trade secrets are exposed? In
refusing to produce trade-secret information to the government
1. Peter Valdes-Dapena, Toyota Recalls Total 8.1 Million Vehicles, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 4,
20o, http://money.cnn.cOm/2010/02/o4/autos/toyota recall_total/index.htm?postversion=
201002041o. Among the models recalled were Camry, Avalon, Prius, and several Lexus models.
Hibah Yousuf, Toyota: 3.8 Million Cars with Risky Floor Mats, CNNMONEY.COM, Oct. 2, 2010,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/09/29/news/companies/toyota-1exus-floormats/.
2. U.S. Launches Criminal Probe into Toyota Safety, MsNBC.cOM, Feb. 22, 2010, http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/ 3 5 5 2o628/ns/business-autos.
3. Curt Anderson & Danny Robbins, AP IMPACT: Toyota Secretive on 'Black Box' Data,
ABCNEWS.coM, Mar. 4, 201o, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory?id=10012461.
4. At the time of this writing, it is unclear precisely what information is contained in the
Toyota black box. It is believed that the data contained in these boxes include data from five
seconds before until two seconds after an air bag is deployed in a crash, such as speed, the
accelerator's angle, gear-shift position, whether the seat belt was used and the angle of the
driver's seat, the brake's position, and the antilock brake system. Id.
5. Id.
6. While based on real events, this hypothetical is fictitious and created to help illustrate
the problem addressed in this Article. However, in the real world, Toyota has generally been
secretive about its black box data. Id. It did recently agree, however, to make some readers to its
black boxes available to the government to aid in the recall investigation. See Stephen Manning
& Tom Raum, US. May Require Brakes That Can Override Gas Pedals in New Cars, USATODAY.COM,
Mar. 2, 201o, http://www.usatoday.com/money/autos/201 o-3-02-toyotadeaths_.N.htm.
7. See, e.g., Mary L. Lyndon, Secrecy and Innovation in Tort Law and Regulation, 23 N.M. L.
REV. 1, 2-3 (1993) ("Proprietary claims to information impose substantial costs on regulation
and hinder such regulatory initiatives as waste reduction.").
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(particularly when they are not required to do so), 8 companies often argue
that the information is vital and essential to their ability to compete
successfully and that it is the kind of information that competitors
desperately desire. Accordingly, sometimes they are either unwilling to
provide trade-secret information at all, or may be willing to provide the
information if and only if the integrity and safety of the information will be
fully protected against direct or indirect disclosure to competitors.9
How should courts approach what I coin as these "refusal-to-submit"
cases? There is a void in the literature and the case law on appropriate
theoretical and doctrinal approaches for the special circumstances created
by these cases. There is much inconsistency in the ways that courts might
approach and resolve them, and no coherent framework exists to address
the unique challenges and considerations they present. For example, while
one might assume that the logical threshold issue should be whether the
information sought to be protected indeed qualifies for trade-secret
protection, courts often bypass that determination in related cases and
instead appear to make value judgments about the relevance of the
information, or whether there is sufficient public benefit to justify
disclosure.
A. A TIMELY AND CONTINUING ISSUE
The sociopolitical climate in the United States makes this a pressing
and timely issue, and one that is likely to continue.1o The recent financial
crisis brought multimillion dollar corporations, as well as individuals on the
eve of retirement, to financial ruin and required government bailouts to
avert even further widespread economic disaster." In the wake of these
8. Companies are often statutorily required to produce information to the government
for regulatory reasons to obtain approvals for their products or services. Accordingly, even if the
information consists of protectable trade secrets, it must be produced unless they wish to forego
the opportunity to conduct that aspect of their business in the United States. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C.
§ 136a(c)(0)(D) (2006) (providing that to sell or distribute a pesticide in the United States, a
manufacturer must register it with the EPA and include the complete formula of the pesticide).
At other times, such as in the Toyota hypothetical, the government requests information that a
company is not statutorily required to submit to the government. While companies may raise
objections to submitting trade secrets, even where required, it is the latter set of circumstances
that is the focus of this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 169-71.
9. Many of these kinds of cases are likely to arise in the context of administrative
subpoenas. See, e.g., U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n v. Tenneco W., 822 F.2d 73, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
FTC v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 626 F.2d 966, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Aon
Consulting, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 6o1, 603 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
to. For example, Philip Goldstein, a cofounder of the hedge fund Bulldog Investors,
refused to disclose to the SEC certain security positions held by the fund and their values. He
argued that disclosure would reveal trade secrets to competitors: namely his trading strategies.
See Hedge Funds Take on SEC over Disclosure Requirements, CNBC, May 17, 2007, http://www.cnbc.
com/id/187227
5 1.
i1 . Interestingly, the Federal Reserve Board refused to disclose information identifying
the financial companies to which it made loans under the government's $2 trillion loan bailout
IOWA LAW REVIE W [Vol. 96:7g91794
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events comes a push for greater transparency of governmental decisions and
greater oversight of private companies by the government in the hope of
better protecting the public.1 2 Coupled with this phenomenon is the fact
that we live in the information age, with all kinds of information easily and
widely available on the Internet. The notion of secrecy is, therefore, not a
chic concept, but rather has probably become passe: when it comes to
information, the popular feeling is probably that more is better.
Moreover, almost immediately upon taking office the Obama
Administration ordered several agencies to review the propriety of keeping
certain company-submitted information secret.' 3  The Obama
Administration has set up a task force "within the [FDA] to recommend ways
to reveal more information about F.D.A. decisions, possibly including the
disclosure of now secret data about drugs and devices under study."' 4 Critics
have complained that keeping this kind of information secret can harm the
public.' 5 Similarly, at the EPA, Congress is considering revisions to the 1976
Toxic Substances Control Act,' 6 which requires manufacturers to report to
program. It argued that such information was protected under the Freedom of Information
Act's ("FOIA") trade-secret and confidential-information exemption. David Glovin & Bob Van
Voris, Federal Reserve Must Disclose Bank Bailout Records (Update 5), BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK,
Mar. 19, 201o, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-l 9/federal-reserve-must-disclose-
bank-bailout-records-updates-.html. A federal appellate court did not agree. Bloomberg, L.P. v.
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 6o F.3 d 143 (2d Cir. 20l0), petition for cert. filed, 79
U.S.L.W. 3271 (U.S. Oct. 26, 2010) (No. 10-543).
12. For instance, the State of New York requested that Bank of America disclose
information about bonuses it paid to Merrill Lynch employees before Bank of America
acquired Merrill Lynch. Bank of America objected to producing the information claiming that
such compensation figures were a trade secret. The State argued that because Bank of America
received $45 billion from the government, it needed to divulge the information. "Taxpayers
demand and deserve transparency," the New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo argued.
BofA Must Disclose Merrill Payout, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 19, 200g, at 3C (internal
quotation marks omitted). A state court judge ruled against Bank of America. See People v.
Thain, 874 N.Y.S.2d 896 (Sup. Ct. 2009).
13. See, e.g., Letter from Andrew J. Emmett, Dir. for Sci. & Regulatory Affairs,
Biotechnology Indus. Org. (BIO), to FDA (Aug. 5, 2009), http://www.bio.org/reg/2oo9o8o5.
pdf (discussing President Obama's Transparency and Open Government initiative and the FDA
task force).
14. Gardiner Harris, Drug Agency May Reveal More Data on Actions, N.Y. TIMES,June 2, 2009,
at Aio. Company information treated as trade secrets before the FDA can include company
plans to test experimental medicines, the complete results of most clinical trials, and the FDA's
reasons for rejecting a company's application to market a product. Id. Results of clinical trials
for a drug that failed to win FDA approval are also secret. Jeanne Lenzer, Drug Secrets: What the
FDA Isn't Telling, SLATE MED. EXAM'R (Sept. 27, 2005, 6:38 AM), http://slate.com/id/212691
8/ (discussing situation where a nineteen-year-old clinical-trial volunteer committed suicide in
testing of antidepressant drug).
15. Harris, supra note 14. For example, a popular diabetes drug made by
GlaxoSmithKline, Avandia, was found to increase the risk of heart attack by forty-two percent,
but that information was kept secret by the FDA. Id.
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2oo6).
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the federal government new chemicals that they intend to market.17
However, the law exempts reporting trade secrets, and it is believed that "95
percent of the notices for new chemicals sent to the government requested
some secrecy."' 8 Critics argue that the secrecy provision makes it difficult to
control potential dangers or for consumers to know to which toxic
substances they may be exposed.' 9 No doubt, the public appeal against
secrecy in circumstances where public health and safety could be at risk is
understandable.2 0
On the other hand, the fact that the existing rules governing the
protection of trade secrets by the various agencies could be revised to offer
even less protection is further cause for concern for trade-secret owners.
Even without any changes, the current patchwork of agency regulations and
practices could pose risks to company trade secrets in the hands of the
government since trade secrets necessarily involve a unique form of property
right that can vanish upon disclosure. Accordingly, the decision to produce
trade-secret information to the government in the first instance is not one to
be made lightly. The current regulations, as well as the direction of pending
revisions to the regulations that shield trade secrets in the government's
custody, suggest that the scope of protection is unclear. This Article
therefore takes on the novel approach of focusing on the front end of the
process-the submittal of company trade secrets to the government in the
first instance.
B. THE ARTICLE'S MissioN
Disclosure of company trade secrets by the government to the public is
already addressed in the elaborate regulatory scheme of agency rules and
regulations, as well as in the FOIA case law.21 However, there is a paucity of
case law and other guidance specifically relevant to refusal-to-submit cases
and when the government is entitled to a company's trade-secret
information. This Article is the first to identify this gap in the law and to
examine the problem from the lens of trade-secret law with an eye toward
developing a more principled approach to resolving these cases. Since it is
the fear of disclosure by the government that triggers the reluctance to
17. Elana Schor, Obama Admin Steps Up Pressure To Ratify Treaties on Toxics, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept.
24, 201o, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/o9/2 4 /2 4 greenwire-obama-admin-steps-up-
pressure-to-ratify-treati-73636.html.
18. Lyndsey Layton, Law Allows Companies To Hide Risks of Chemicals, WASH. POST, Jan. 4,
2010, atAi.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Rowe, Patents, Genetically Modified Food, and IP Overreaching, 64
SMU L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2011 ) (arguing that patent law's support of research
restrictions on genetically modified foods threatens public health and is against the public
interest).
21. See discussion infra Part II.C.
[Vol. g6:7917g6
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release trade-secret information in the refusal-to-submit cases, I consider
existing regulations that determine how the government treats confidential
business information already in its possession. In addition, I examine cases
that address, in other contexts, when one party can be ordered to produce
its trade secrets to another. Lessons from these cases ultimately help frame
my proposed "shield-or-disclose" model.
The framework proposed in the Article has wide-reaching application
and could be instructive to the larger body of cases where a party seeks to
compel production of another's trade secrets. However, the Article, by
necessity, has a more targeted analytical focus that pays particular attention
to the void that has been identified in the refusal-to-submit cases. In
particular, it focuses on the scenario represented by the Toyota hypothetical
where a company refuses to submit trade-secret information to the
government for compliance or regulatory reasons.2 2 The shield-or-disclose
model, among other things, makes clear the roles and burdens the various
players must assume. It requires a threshold determination that the
information in question qualifies for trade-secret protection under the
common law. It also requires evidence of need, relevance, and potential
harm before a court could order disclosure.
In the process of deriving guidance for the creation of the shield-or-
disclose model, this Article makes a further contribution by analyzing the
varied and obscure patchwork of agency rules, as well as related areas of case
law, to succinctly identify themes and approaches relevant to the refusal-to-
submit problem. Following this introduction, Part II provides relevant
background on trade-secret law and a sampling of the agency rules that
govern the protection of trade secrets received by the government. Part II
explores why companies may have reason to be concerned about submitting
trade-secret information to the government. Part III undertakes a review of
the approaches courts use to determine when to order the production of
trade secrets in other contexts. Part IV introduces the shield-or-disclose
model and suggests other contexts in which the framework might be useful.
Finally, this Article concludes in Part V that the guidelines proposed provide
a more balanced approach that is specifically tailored to the needs of the
individual case and reaches more of a middle-ground solution than
currently exists to achieve the balance between secrecy and access.
22. Accordingly, this Article is not directly concerned with other scenarios, such as the
disclosure of trade secrets between parties in litigation or cases where companies have entered
into a business relationship with the government, such as with vendors or contractors for
government services. These scenarios have been appropriately addressed elsewhere. See, e.g.,
David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L.
REV. 135 (2007) (arguing that companies providing services for public infrastructure should
disclose trade secrets for access and transparency).
2o0111] 797
HeinOnline  -- 96 Iowa L. Rev. 797 2010-2011
IOWA LAWREVIEW
II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
This Part provides relevant background on trade secrets and the kinds
of injury that could result from the government's inappropriate disclosure
of a company's trade secrets. It also introduces the relevant regulatory
landscape by discussing the mechanism by which the federal government
makes third-party information available to the public-FOIA.23 Moreover, it
provides a snapshot of the intricate patchwork of agency rules and
regulations that govern the treatment of trade-secret information. Finally, in
light of this regulatory framework and the unique nature of trade secrets, it
explains why companies may fear submitting trade secrets to the
government. Before going further, it is worth clarifying that this Article
treats trade-secret information as separate from the larger category of
confidential business information. Thus, it is important to keep in mind that
when regulations refer to confidential information, in keeping with the
principles of trade-secret law, they necessarily refer to a larger body, a small
subset of which would be legally protectable trade secrets.24
A. TRADE-SECRET INTRODUCTION
A trade secret can be any business information that is secret and derives
value from its secrecy.2 5 Trade-secret law derives from state law.26 Most states
have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA"), which provides
some uniformity in defining trade secrets and trade-secret misappropriation.
The states that have not adopted the UTSA tend to rely on common law
based on the Restatement of Torts.27 Finally, and more recently, the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition28 also addresses trade secrets.2 9
23. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006), amended by OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 1 10-
175, 121 Stat. 2524.
24. See generally Elizabeth A. Rowe, Trade Secret Litigation and Free Speech: Is It Time To
Restrain the Plaintffs, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1425, 1447 (2009) (discussing the substantive
requirements for establishing that business information is a protectable trade secret).
25. UNIF. TRADE SECRETsAct § 1(4 ) (i) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A 5 3 8 (2005).
26. There are federal criminal statutes that address espionage and the inappropriate
disclosure of trade secrets by a federal employee. These are the Economic Espionage Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1831-1839 (2oo6), and the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2oo6). However, the
bodies of civil law are state based.
27. See MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, EPSTEIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 1.02, at 1-4 (5 th ed.
2oo6). The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition now also governs trade secrets, and its
rules apply to actions under both the UTSA and the Restatement of Torts. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 reporters' note (1995).
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39-45-
29. This is an interesting shift in the overall treatment of this area of the law, which
corresponds with the growing union of trade-secret and unfair-competition issues becoming
evident in the case law. For instance, unfair-competition claims involving trade secrets often
mirror trade-secret-misappropriation claims. See, e.g., GlobeSpan, Inc. v. O'Neill, 151 F. Supp.
2d 1229, 1235-36 (C.D. Cal. 2001); IBM, Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., No. Civ. 3-91-630, 1991
WL 757821, at *4 (D. Minn. Dec. 31, 1991).
7g8 [Vol. g6:7g1
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Its rules apply to actions under both the UTSA and the Restatement of
Torts.30 Most courts appear to rely on the definitions in the UTSA3' or in
the Restatement of Torts,32 and as such, this Article will also rely on them for
most of the analysis that follows.
The modern formulation of trade-secret law in the UTSA defines a
trade secret very broadly, and virtually anything of competitive value to a
company can be a trade secret as long as it is kept secret.33 Accordingly, a
wide range of confidential business information, including customer lists,
sales records, pricing information, and customer information, can be
protectable trade secrets.34 Some jurisdictions have also granted trade-secret
protection to secret contract terms, marketing strategies, and industry
studies.35 Further, under the UTSA, a trade secret does not need to be in
30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 reporters' note.
31. The UTSA defines a trade secret as:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005). The UTSA requires
only reasonable efforts-not all conceivable efforts-to protect the confidentiality of trade
secrets. See Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 828 F.2d 452, 455 (8th Cir. 1987); see also
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs. Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1253-54
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (stating that the Church of Scientology made reasonable efforts under UTSA
to protect the secrecy of religious documents through the use of locked cabinets and safes,
logging and identification of materials, electronic sensors, alarms, photo identifications,
security personnel, and confidentiality agreements for all given access to materials).
32. See EPSTEIN, supra note 27, § 1.02, at 1-4. The Restatement of Torts defines a trade
secret as "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do
not know or use it." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). The Restatement then
provides examples, stating that a trade secret "may be a formula for a chemical compound, a
process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other
device, or a list of customers." Id.
33. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1(4). The UTSA requires reasonable efforts to protect the
confidentiality of trade secrets. See Surgidev, 828 F.2d at 455.
34. McFarland v. Brier, No. C.A. 96-1007, 1998 WL 269223, at *3 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 13,
1998), vacated, 769 A.2d 605 (R.I. 2001).
35. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F-3 d 1262, 1265-70 (7 th Cir. 1995) (finding
strategic financial and marketing information to be protected trade secrets under the UTSA);
ConAgra, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 30 S.W- 3 d 725, 728-30 (Ark. 2000) (recognizing that
Tyson's business information concerning production, marketing strategies, pricing programs,
and contract terms are protectable trade secrets under the UTSA, but refusing to grant such
protection for failure to maintain their secrecy).
201 1] 7gg
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use to be protected, and negative informations6-comprised of failed
research or an ineffective process-is also protected.37
Trade-secret rights derive, in large part, from property interests.38 The
value of a trade secret rests in the information itself, not just the medium on
which it is recorded. Once the information becomes public, the property
aspect is gone. Thus, when a trade secret is disclosed and becomes generally
known to others, it loses its status as a trade secret, and that status cannot be
reclaimed.39 If the trade-secret information passes into the hands of a third
party, such as a competitor or the press, the trade-secret owner may not have
any recourse against the third party or any ability to stop the dissemination
or use.40 That is because where a party learns a trade secret through a
disclosure that was not made in breach of a contract or special relationship,
or with knowledge of such a breach, she is entitled to use it.4'1 Therefore, a
trade-secret owner may have no protection for a trade secret that is
accidentally disclosed.42 If a trade secret is disclosed to one who has not
promised confidentiality, and it is then released publicly, its status as a trade
secret vanishes.43 The significance of these basic principles in the context of
the refusal-to-submit cases is discussed below.
B. THE COST OFDISCLOSURE BY THE GOVERNMENT
If a company submitted trade-secret information to the government and
that information was disclosed by the government to the public, it is the
trade-secret owner who would ultimately bear the cost of the government's
misguided action. This is in part because when a trade secret is revealed, it
loses all of its value, the loss is irreparable, and the company may not be
36. A negative trade secret is the knowledge of what not to do or what does not work-a
lesson learned from a certain process or research and development effort that failed. SeeJAMES
POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 4.02[3] (1997).
37. See i ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01 [2] [a] (2008) (discussing
the UTSA).
38. See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 6 1 STAN.
L. REV. 311, 324-26 (2008).
39. FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984).
40. See generally Elizabeth A. Rowe, Saving Trade Secret Disclosures on the Internet Through
Sequential Preservation, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 14-17 (2007) (discussing how a third party
may not be guilty of stealing a trade secret if the information was not a trade secret at the time
he or she acquired it).
41. See RESTATEMENT OFTORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939).
42. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974); Fisher Stoves, Inc. v.
All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 196 (ist Cir. 1980) ("[E]ven a bona fide trade
secret is not protected against discovery by fair means, including accidental disclosure.").
43. See Lockridge v. Tweco Prods., Inc., 497 P.2d 131, 134 (Kan. 1972) ("Once the secret
is published to the 'whole world,' . . . it loses its protected status and becomes available to others
for use and copying without fear of legal reprisal from the original possessor." (quoting
Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
800 [Vol. 96:791
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made whole by monetary damages. 44 An aggrieved trade-secret owner may
have a trade-secret-misappropriation claim or constitutional-takings claim
against the government.45 There may also be a possible criminal action
under the Trade Secrets Act against an individual government employee
who discloses a trade secret.46 However, none of these options may provide a
satisfactory remedy, and legal recourse against the government may also be
tenuous. The Trade Secrets Act does not provide a private right of action.47
Moreover, a claim under the Act could only be against an individual, and
any fine may not exceed $1000.48 It therefore provides practically no
compensation to a company that may have suffered a multimillion dollar
loss as a result of an inappropriate disclosure of its trade secret. Accordingly,
the more feasible option with a better chance for damages may be a takings
claim. As discussed below, however, those claims present their own
challenges.
Trade secrets are a type of property.49 Under the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause, the government may take property for public use only upon
just compensation.5o When the government takes a trade secret for public
use and compensates the owner of the trade secret, it is not an
unconstitutional taking.S' However, the government may not exercise its
44. See Wearly v. FTC, 462 F. Supp. 589, 599-600 (D.N.J. 1978), vacated, 616 F.2d 662,
663 (3 d Cir. 198o) (holding that the matter was not "ripe" forjudicial review).
45. Sovereign immunity does not bar the filing of a trade-secret claim against the
government for disclosure of trade secrets. Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3 d 1249,
1256 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
46. The Trade Secrets Act provides that:
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any
department or agency thereof ... publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in
any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any information coming to him
in the course of his employment or official duties or by reason of any examination
or investigation made by, or return, report or record made to or filed with, such
department or agency or officer or employee thereof, which information concerns
or relates to the trade secrets, ... shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both; and shall be removed from office or employment.
18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2006).
47. Id. While the Trade Secrets Act does not furnish a private cause of action to enjoin
government disclosure, a violation of the Act may be decisive in a judicial review of agency
action under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.
281, 316-18 (1979).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1905.
49. See, e.g., Mark Q. Connelly, Secrets and Smokescreens: A Legal and Economic Analysis of
Government Disclosures of Business Data, ig8i Wis. L. REV. 207, 242.
50. See U.S. CONsT. amend V.
51. SeeJohn C. Janka, Comment, Federal Disclosure Statutes and the Fifth Amendment: The New
Status of Trade Secrets, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 334, 338-39, 343-44 (1987) (discussing Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), and public use).
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sovereign power to take for private use.5 2 In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the
U.S. Supreme Court held that a federal pesticide statute constituted a taking
of trade secrets in some circumstances when the EPA used studies submitted
by one pesticide manufacturer in evaluating similar pesticides by the
manufacturer's competitors.53 In the circumstances where it found a taking,
the Court focused on statutory language that seemed to guarantee the
manufacturer confidentiality for its trade secrets, noting that "[t]his explicit
governmental guarantee formed the basis of a reasonable investment-backed
expectation."54
For information submitted by Monsanto during another period,
however, the Court found that the government had made no guarantee of
confidentiality.55 Rather, Monsanto chose to enter a U.S. market "that long
has been the focus of great public concern and significant government
regulation," and should not have reasonably expected that the trade secrets
would remain confidential.56 Accordingly, it ruled there was no taking with
respect to that information.57 The Court also held that Monsanto could not
rely on any promise of confidentiality from the Trade Secrets Act.58
Monsanto is therefore a mixed bag for trade-secret owners whose trade
secrets have been inappropriately used or disclosed by the government.
There is a real risk that when a company submits business information to an
agency and it falls into the hands of a competitor, a court could find there
was no promise of confidentiality, and thus no taking.59 Query whether the
various agency provisions dealing with confidentiality might serve to craft an
argument in favor of confidentiality, thus establishing the government's
explicit guarantee of confidentiality.60 One court has found that a trade-
secret owner was within its rights to seek a protective order prior to
responding to an agency's administrative subpoena where the agency was
52. Wearly v. FTC, 462 F. Supp. 589, 598 (D.N.J. 1978), vacated, 616 F.2d 662 (3 d Cir.
98o).
53. 467 U.S. at 1020; see also Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3 d 24, 45-46 (ist Cir.
2002) (citing Monsanto to conclude that a Massachusetts statute effected a taking of tobacco
companies' trade secrets).
54. 467 U.S. at 1011.
55. Id. at l oo8.
56. Id. at loo8-og.
57. Id. at loio.
58. Id. at loo8-og.
59. See id. at 1022 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
she was "frankly puzzled" by the majority's premise that "the degree of Government regulation
determines the reasonableness of an expectation of confidentiality").
6o. See 3 MILGRIM, supra note 37, § 12.04 (listing statutes prohibiting disclosure of trade
secrets or confidential information by the FTC, SEC, IRS, FDA, FAA, Social Security
Administration, and others).
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not acting pursuant to an explicit rule that provided protection for the trade
secrets. 6 1
As discussed below, however, a review of a sampling of those regulations
suggests that any such guarantee would not be absolute since the
government generally reserves the right to disclose trade secrets to those not
covered by the regulations. This includes Congress, for instance, and any
disclosures by a member of Congress may not constitute an unconstitutional
taking for private use. 6 2
C. SNAPSHOT OF THE RULEs
There is a dearth of case law and other guidance specifically relevant to
refusal-to-submit cases and when the government is entitled to demand
trade-secret information. For that reason, I will now consider a sampling of
existing regulations that govern how the government treats confidential
business information already in its possession. This will provide insight into
how the government safeguards trade-secret information, a relevant
consideration in deciding whether trade secrets should be entrusted to a
government agency in the first place. Moreover, it is the fear of disclosure by
the government that sets the stage for the reluctance to release trade-secret
information to the government in the refusal-to-submit cases. Lessons from
this review will be incorporated into my shield-or-disclose model.
The government has an interest in maintaining the confidentiality of
trade-secret information disclosed to it. Agencies, as part of their regulatory
function, receive a vast amount of proprietary information from businesses.
Accordingly, the agencies have instituted rules by which such information
will be kept confidential and not disclosed to the public or to competitors. A
sampling of those rules is discussed in this Part. Even in the absence of an
explicit obligation, however, the government should have an incentive to
secure the privacy of business information because without such assurances,
companies will be less willing to provide information, or complete
information, to the government. As the FTC argued in a case involving its
inadvertent disclosure of Whole Foods Inc.'s trade secrets63:
61. See U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n v. Tenneco W., 822 F.2d 73, 8o (D.C. Cir. 1987). To the
extent the government was planning to use trade-secret information submitted by a company to
prosecute the company, it may implicate another right under the Fifth Amendment-the right
against self-incrimination. The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself when the
testimony may tend to incriminate the witness is a central tenet of criminal procedure. See
United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3 d 552, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (discussing Fifth Amendment
protections in the context of producing documents to the government), affil, 530 U.S. 27
(2000). However, that discussion is beyond the scope of this Article.
62. SeeJanka, supra note 51, at 338-39.
63. See Christopher S. Rubager, Error by FTC Reveals Whole Foods' Trade Secrets, WASH. POST,
Aug. 15, 2007, at D3.
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It is axiomatic that if business secrets turned over to the Federal
Trade Commission in furtherance of law enforcement efforts are
thereby made available to firms in the same industry, companies
will be less willing to provide that information to the Commission
in the first instance. As a result, the Commission's ability to enforce
the antitrust laws, among others, is impeded to the public's
detriment.64
This lack of candor could hinder the government's regulatory activity,
and ultimately the public interest. These values are reflected in the
standards that the courts have applied in FOIA cases to determine whether
requested information will be withheld from the public.65
A qualified right to protect trade secrets is reflected in the agencies'
rules. One of the challenges of analyzing this body of rules is that it consists
of an intricate patchwork of regulations and statutes, often with each agency
having several separate regulations governing the treatment of trade secrets.
Accordingly, this Part attempts to present a snapshot of the regulatory
landscape to provide a sense of the wide variation with which businesses
must contend. First, however, it is important to understand FOIA as relevant
to this discussion since the agencies' protection regulations aim to describe
what information should and should not be available to the public through
FOIA.
1. FOIA
Under FOIA,66 anyone may request copies of documents that form the
records of agencies of the Executive Branch.6 7 One does not need to show
standing, legitimate interest, or any other threshold requirement to be
entitled to the information.68 Most FOIA requests come from businesses
64. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Whole Food Market, Inc.'s
Motion for Entry of a Final Protective Order at 7, FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502 F. Supp.
2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. O7 -cv-01021-PLF), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o71011
4/o7o62oresponse.pdf, rev'd, 548 F. 3 d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2oo8).
65. See discussion infra accompanying notes 2 2 2-23.
66. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006), amended by OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 1 o-
175, 121 Stat. 2524.
67. Each of the states have statutes similar to FOIA. See, e.g., Burt A. Braverman & Wesley
R. Heppler, A Practical Review of State Open Records Laws, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 720 (1981);
Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, What Constitutes "Trade Secrets" Exempt from Disclosure Under State
Freedom of Information Act, 27 A.L.R. 4TH 773 (1984). While this Article will only address the
federal law, the proposal in this framework could apply to disclosure of trade secrets on the
state level as well. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
68. Wearly v. FTC, 462 F. SuPP. 589, 6oo (D.N.J. 1978), vacated, 616 F.2d 662 (3 d Cir.
1980).
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seeking information on their competitors.69 If trade-secret information is
disclosed through a FOIA request, it could become the kind of private use of
information that constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause.70 FOIA therefore presents a considerable risk of loss to trade-secret
holders.
FOIA contains exemptions against disclosure of trade secrets. 7 '
However, it is significant to note that the Supreme Court has found these
exemptions to be permissive, not mandatory.7 2 Thus, while FOIA permits
the agencies to withhold company records containing trade secrets, it does
not require them to do so. 73 Most relevant to this discussion, subsection 3 of
5 U.S.C. § 5 5 2(b) ("Exemption 3"), exempts. information that is "specifically
exempted from disclosure by statute," 74 and subsection 4 ("Exemption 4")
exempts "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential."75 Note that Exemption 4
applies to a wider category of information beyond trade secrets, i.e.,
"commercial or financial information."76 This would presumably be
information that is confidential and proprietary to the company, but not
necessarily a trade secret. Exemption 4 is the category most applicable and
most often used in FOIA litigation to protect trade secrets and confidential
information.77 None of the exemptions, however, apply to Congress.78
There is thus the risk that Congress could request information from an
agency, increasing the chances that the information could be leaked or that
69. Michael Moss, Public Eye: Federal Service Gets Wider Use by Sleuths, Snoops-and Senators,
WALL ST.J.,Jan. 3, 1996, at Ai (quoting one source as estimating that seventy-five percent of all
FOIA requests come from businesses).
70. See supra Part II.B.
71. 5 U.S.C. § 5 5 2(b)(3)-( 4 ).
72. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292-94 (1979).
73. Nevertheless, one must first determine whether that material falls within one of the
applicable exemptions to then decide whether that information can be withheld by the
government as falling outside of FOIA.
74. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (3).
75. Id- § 5 5 2(b)( 4 )-
76. Id.
77. It is questionable when and whether Exemption 3 applies to protect trade secrets,
mostly because courts differ on whether there is a statute that specifically exempts trade secrets
from disclosure within the meaning of Exemption 3. Compare Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at goo
n.29 (citing Adm'r v. Robertson, 442 U.S. 255, 264-65 (1975), superseded by statute,
Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94 -4 09, go Stat. 1241 (1976)), and Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d igo, 1199-203 (4 th Cir. 1976) (finding the Trade Secrets
Act to be an Exemption 3 withholding statute), abrogated by Gen. Motors Corp. v. Marshall, 654
F.2d 294 (4 th Cir. 1981), with Anderson v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936,
948-49 (ioth Cir. iggo) (finding the Trade Secrets Act is not an Exemption 3 withholding
statute), and Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 750 F.2d 1394, 1401-02 (7 th
Cir. 1984).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 5 5 2(d) ("This section is not authority to withhold information from
Congress.").
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a member of Congress could use the Speech or Debate Clause 79 to discuss
the information openly on the congressional floor and thereby destroy the
proprietary information.8o
According to the Director of the Office of Public Information and
Library Services, it is only through FOIA that the general public would be
able to access a copy of an agency record.8 ' When a request is received, the
Office of Public Information and Library Services will assign the request to
the agencies with jurisdiction over the record(s) at issue. There are trained
staff within each of these component offices who are responsible for
searching for the requested records, reviewing these records to determine
whether they should be released, and redacting nonreleasable information
(subject to both FOIA and the agency's implementing regulations).8 2 In
making a disclosure decision, the FOI officer of the particular agency would
consider the records in light of the FOIA statute and the agency's
implementing regulations.83
When a submitter of trade secrets to an agency seeks to prevent the
agency from disclosing the trade secrets to a third-party FOIA requester, the
mechanism for doing so within the courts is known as a reverse-FOIA
action.8 4 The process of a reverse-FOIA action occurs in two major
sequential stages. In the first stage the submitter objects to the prospective
disclosure directly to the agency, and in the second stage the submitter can
appeal an unfavorable determination by the agency in federal court.
The procedural steps of the first stage of a reverse-FOIA action typically
begin when a requester submits a request to an agency for agency records
under FOIA. 85 If, after receiving and reviewing the request, the agency
7g. Article I, Section 6 of the U.S. Constitution grants an absolute privilege to members of
Congress for any remarks made as part of an official proceeding in the Senate or the House,
regardless of any harm it may cause, unless it amounts to a criminal act. RoY L. MOORE &
MICHAEL D. MURRAY, MEDIA LAW AND ETHICS 414-15 (3 d ed. 2008).
8o. See, e.g., Wearly v. FTC, 462 F. Supp. 589, 6oo (D.N.J. 1978) (discussing incident
involving SenatorJoseph McCarthy), vacated, 616 F.2d 662 (3 d Cir. 1980).
81. The DOJ has provided a guide to FOIA in which it discusses what is a trade secret. U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (2009), available at http://
wwwjustice.gov/oip/foiaguideog.htm.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 83o F.2d 1132, 1133 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Mallinckrodt
Inc. v. West, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2000) ("In a 'reverse FOIA' case, the court has
jurisdiction when a party disputes an agency's decision to release information under FOIA."),
appeal dismissed voluntayily, No. 00-5330 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 12, 2000); Cortez III Serv. Corp. v.
NASA, 921 F. Supp. 8, II (D.D.C. 1996) (holding that in reverse FOIA actions "courts have
jurisdiction to hear complaints brought by parties claiming that an agency decision to release
information adversely affects them"), appeal dismissed voluntarily, No. 96-5163 (D.C. Cir. July 3,
1996).
85. See 5 U.S.C. § 5 5 2(a)( 3 )(A) (2006), amended by OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub.
L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524.
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determines that it may disclose the requested information, it must give
notice to the submitter of the information pursuant to Executive Order
1 2 ,6 oo.86 When the submitter receives notice that the agency has
determined that the submitter's information must be disclosed under FOIA,
the submitter may begin the first stage of a reverse-FOIA action by objecting
to the disclosure to the agency. 87 In the situations involving potential
disclosure of the submitter's trade secrets, the submitter will object to
disclosure on grounds that the information falls within Exemption 4 of
FOIA.88 If the agency agrees that the information requested falls within
FOIA's Exemption 4, the agency must not disclose the information because
it is barred from doing so under the UTSA.8 9
However, if the agency makes a final determination that the
information does not fall within Exemption 4 and thus must be disclosed,
the submitter may proceed to the second stage of a reverse-FOIA action by
suing the agency in federal court under the APA.90 In reviewing agency
action under the APA, the court will examine the record developed by the
agency to determine whether the agency's actions were arbitrary and
capricious.9 '
2. Sample Disclosure Provisions and Exemptions
Against the backdrop of FOIA, this Subpart will catalog how the
regulations of a representative sampling of federal agencies address trade
secrets that have been submitted to them. The agencies which were
randomly selected for discussion are the FDA, the SEC, the FTC, and the
EPA. For each agency, I will describe relevant and noteworthy points of its
86. Exec. Order No. 12,600, 3 C.F.R. 235 (1987).
87. Id. at 23 6-3 7.
88. 5 U.S.C. § 5 5 2(b)( 4 ).
89. CNA, 83o F.2d at 1151-52; see, e.g., Pac, Architects & Eng'rs v. U.S. Dep't of State, 906
F.2d 1345, 1347 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that when the release of requested information is
barred by the Trade Secrets Act, "the agency does not have discretion to release it"); Envtl.
Tech., Inc. v. EPA, 822 F. Supp. 1226, 1228 (E.D. Va. 1993) ("[T]he Trade Secrets Act bars
disclosure of information that falls within Exemption 4 .. . ." (citation omitted)); Gen.
Dynamics Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 822 F. Supp. 804, 8o6 (D.D.C. 1992) ("[T]he
Trade Secrets Act is an independent prohibition on the disclosure of information within its
scope." (citation omitted)), vacated, No. 92-5186, 1993 WL 411465 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 23, 1993);
see also Office of Info. Policy, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, OIP Guidance: Discretionary Disclosure and
Exemption 4, FOIA UPDATE, Summer 1985, http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-updates/VolVI
3/page3.htm (discussing Trade Secrets Act bar to discretionary disclosure under Exemption 4).
go. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006); see, e.g., Canadian Commercial Corp. v. Dep't of the Air Force,
514 F. 3 d 37, 3g (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
91. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 318 (1979) (citing 5
U.S.C. § 706); Campaign for Family Farms v. Glickman, 200 F.3 d 1 18o, i184 (8th Cir. 2000);
Reliance Elec. Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 924 F.2d 274. 277 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Gen.
Dynamics, 822 F. Supp. at 8o6; Davis Corp. v. United States, No. 87-3365, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17611, at *5-6 (D.D.C.Jan. 19, 1988).
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corresponding regulations or statutes concerning its treatment of trade
secrets and any exemptions that allow disclosure of trade secrets. This
attempt to parse through the regulations to identify, compare, and describe
concisely the patterns and themes that bear on their protection of trade
secrets is another unique contribution of this Article.
a. FDA
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prohibits the revealing of
trade secrets.92 However, it "does not authorize the withholding of
information from either House of Congress" or any authorized committee
or subcommittee.93 The general public may access information held by the
FDA through a FOIA request.94 In making disclosures to the public, the
FDA's regulations provide for "fullest possible disclosure" consistent with the
"property rights of persons in trade secrets ... and the need for the agency
to promote frank internal policy deliberations and to pursue its regulatory
activities without disruption."95 Additional regulations further provide that
when a request for alleged trade-secret information is received, if the FDA is
uncertain about whether the material is in fact protected, the FDA will
consult with the trade-secret owner to determine if the material should be
disclosed.96 If a trade-secret owner disagrees with the FDA's decision that it
should make the secret available to the public, then the trade-secret owner
may seek judicial review.97
92. 21 U.S.C. § 331(j) (2006). The section provides as follows:
The following acts and the causing thereof are hereby prohibited:
() The using by any person to his own advantage, or revealing, other than to
the Secretary or officers or employees of the Department, or to the courts when
relevant in anyjudicial proceeding under [21 U.S.C. H§ 301-399], any information
acquired under authority of section 344 ... concerning any method or process
which as a trade secret is entitled to protection; or the violating of [21 U.S.C.
§ 34 6a(i) (2)] or any regulation issued under that section.
Id.
93. Id.
94. According to 45 C.F.R. § 5.31 (2oog): If the records sought are "exclusively records of
the Food and Drug Administration, only the Associate Commissioner for Public Affairs, FDA,
who also is the FDA Freedom of Information Officer, may determine whether to release or deny
the records." Id. § 5.31(a) (2) (ii).
95. 21 C.F.R. § 20.20 (2010).
g6. 21 C.F.R. § 20.47 (2010).
97. 21 C.F.R. § 20.48 (2olo).Judicial review is available under 5 U.S.C. § 702. The section
further provides:
Where the Food and Drug Administration consults with a person who will be
affected by a proposed disclosure of data or information contained in Food and
Drug Administration records pursuant to § 20.47, and rejects the person's request
that part or all of the records not be made available for public disclosure, the
decision constitutes final agency action that is subject to judicial review pursuant to
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Another set of regulations provides further guidance on the agency's
handling and disclosure of trade secrets by setting forth the agency's
definition of a trade secret and establishing the procedure for producing
requested information to the public.98 The FDA appears to have adopted a
definition of "trade secret" similar to that from the Restatement (Second) of
Torts,99 but in some ways narrower. While it is a more restrictive definition
than the modem definition under the UTSA, the agency regulations also
protect from disclosure the wider subset of confidential commercial or
financial information, not just trade secrets.' 0 0
When the agency receives a request for potentially trade-secret or
confidential information, it notifies the submitter of its right to object within
five working days.' 0 The FDA (it is unclear who at the FDA makes this
decision) then reviews the basis for the objection and decides whether to
sustain the objection, and thus not make the information available, or
disagree with the objection, and thus disclose it.1O2 If the agency deems that
the information should be disclosed, the submitter is notified of the agency's
decision, and has five working days to file an action in a U.S. district
court. 03 A separate regulation, appearing to work in tandem with the
provisions for notice above, also provides that if the trade-secret owner fails
to intervene in a court proceeding to defend the exempt status of the
5 U.S.C. chapter 7. The person affected will be permitted 5 days after receipt of
notification of such decision within which to institute suit in a United States
District Court to enjoin release of the records involved. If suit is brought, the Food
and Drug Administration will not disclose the records involved until the matter
and all related appeals have been concluded.
Id.
98. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.61 (2010).
99. The regulation states that:
A trade secret may consist of any commercially valuable plan, formula, process,
or device that is used for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of
trade commodities and that can be said to be the end product of either innovation
or substantial effort. There must be a direct relationship between the trade secret
and the productive process.
Id. § 20.61(a). This last sentence requiring a direct relationship between the trade secret and
the process does not appear in the Restatement of Torts. See also 21 C.F.R. § 7 20.8(b) (2010)
(applying the six-prong test from the Restatement of Torts to determine whether information
qualifies as a trade secret for cosmetic ingredients).
too. The section defined privileged or confidential commercial or financial information as
"information which is used in one's business and is of a type customarily held in strict
confidence or regarded as privileged and not disclosed to any member of the public by the
person to whom it belongs." 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(b).
101. Id.§ 20.61 (e)(1)-(2).
102. Id. § 20.61(e) (3).
103. Id.
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materials, then the submitter could be deemed to have waived its
objection. 104
b. SEC
Like the FDA, the SEC also provides for the nondisclosure of
confidential business information and has its own procedures governing
FOIA requests. These provisions and procedures, however, differ from those
observed at the FDA. No specific definition of "trade secret" (or
"confidential information") appears to be included in the SEC
regulations, 0 5 even though mention is made of trade secrets in a few
areas.106 Rather, the regulations appear to incorporate FOIA and a catch-all
of "other reason[s] permitted by Federal law," which would encapsulate
trade secrets. 0 7 Nevertheless, the fact that confidential business information
comprises the broader group of information of which trade secrets are a
subset leaves no doubt that the rules would cover trade secrets. However, it is
interesting that, unlike the FDA, no effort appears to have been made to
define "trade secrets."
Similar to the FDA rules, the confidentiality rules do not authorize the
withholding of any information from Congress.1os In addition, unlike the
FDA, an SEC exemption permits the agency, in its discretion, to provide all
records to any person deemed appropriate by the Commission as long as the
person makes a showing of need and provides assurances of confidentiality
for records.1o 9 It is unclear how and whether this provision fits with FOIA.
104. 21 C.F.R. § 20-55 (2010) ("Whenever the Food and Drug Administration denies a
request for a record or portion thereof on the grounds that the record or portion thereof is
exempt from public disclosure as trade secret ... under § 20.61, and the person requesting the
record subsequently contests the denial in the courts, the Food and Drug Administration will so
inform the person affected, i.e., the person who submitted the record, and will require that
such person intervene to defend the exempt status of the record. ... If the affected person fails
to intervene to defend the exempt status of the records and to itemize and index the disputed
records, the Food and Drug Administration will take this failure into consideration in deciding
whether that person has waived such exemption so as to require the Food and Drug
Administration to promptly make the records available for public disclosure.").
105. A search and review of the following SEC regulations governing the treatment of
confidential information did not reveal a definition of "trade secret": 5 U.S.C. § 7o6 (2006); 15
U.S.C. §78x (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 2oo.8o (2010); 17 C.F.R. § 200.83 (2010); 17 C.F.R.
§ 200.402 (2010); 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2010); 17 C.F.R. § 24 0.2 4 b-2 (2010).
1o6. See 17 C.F.R. § 2oo.80; 17 C.F.R. § 200.402; 17 C.F.R. § 229-402.
t07. 17 C.F.R. § 2oo.83(c)(1) ("Any person who, either voluntarily or pursuant to any
requirement of law, submits any information or causes or permits any information to be
submitted to the Commission, which information is entitled to confidential treatment ... ,may
request that the Commission afford confidential treatment under the Freedom of Information
Act to such information for reasons of personal privacy or business confidentiality, or for any
other reason permitted by Federal law. . .
io8. 15 U.S.C. § 78x(e)(2).
tog. Id. § 78x(c) ("The Commission may, in its discretion and upon a showing that such
information is needed, provide all 'records' . . . and other information in its possession to such
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Presumably, this would apply to requests outside of FOIA. 0 However, one
could also infer that the SEC could decide to disclose trade-secret
information to a person or entity, including foreign persons (not just
another government agency), without complying with the established FOIA
disclosure procedures as long as it is satisfied that the receiving party will
maintain appropriate confidentiality of the records. "
The procedure for requesting confidential treatment of information is
also different from that of the FDA's. For the SEC to treat information as
confidential, the submitter must omit from the material filed that portion
that it wishes to remain confidential and must mark the omitted material as
"confidential material" before filing it with the SEC.' 12 However, a
determination on whether the material will indeed be treated as confidential
is not made until a FOIA request has been received by a member of the
public for the materials." 3 The regulation lists nine factors that one
requesting confidential treatment may address to substantiate the request." 4
It is noteworthy that only two of.those are among the recognizable six-factor
trade-secret test under the Restatement of Torts, as used by the FDA."5
persons, both domestic and foreign, as the Commission by rule deems appropriate if the person
receiving such records or information provides such assurances of confidentiality as the
Commission deems appropriate.").
1io. Courts have applied 15 U.S.C. § 78x(c) outside of FOIA. See, e.g., SEC v. Merrill Scott
& Assocs., Ltd., No. 2:O2-CV- 3 0-TC, 2008 WL 276502, at *2 (D. Utah Jan. 30, 2008) (holding
that pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78x(c), the SEC could release confidential information to the
DOJ), affd in part and rev'd in part, 6oo F.3 d 1262 (loth Cir. 2010); SEC v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Holdings, Inc., No. MISC.A.o 3 -i6 5 i(JDB), 2004 WL 3168281, at *12-13 (D.D.C.
June 29, 2004) (holding that pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78x(c) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.24c-1, the
SEC could use its discretion to release confidential information to the DOJ).
iii. See MerrillScott, 2oo8 WL 276502, at *2.
112. 17 C.F.R. § 2 4 0.2 4 b-2 (20lo). This section is also read in conjunction with 17 C.F.R.
§ 2oo.83, a separate regulation dealing with confidential treatment under FOIA. See id.
§ 24 0.2 4 b-2(b)(2).
113. 17 C.F.R. § 200.83(c)(6) (2010).
114. Id.§2oo.83 (d)(2).
115. See id. § 2oo.8 3 (d)(2)(v)-(vi). This subsection reads:
(2) Substantiation of a request for confidential treatment shall consist of a
statement setting forth, to the extent appropriate or necessary for the
determination of the request for confidential treatment, the following information
regarding the request:
(i) The reasons, concisely stated and referring to specific exemptive provisions
of the Freedom of Information Act, why the information should be withheld from
access under the Freedom of Information Act;
(ii) The applicability of any specific statutory or regulatory provisions which
govern or may govern the treatment of the information;
(iii) The existence and applicability of any prior determinations by the
Commission, other Federal agencies, or a court, concerning confidential treatment
of the information;
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Those two are the "measures taken by the business to protect the
confidentiality" of the materials and the "ease or difficulty of a competitor's
obtaining or compiling" the information." 6 The SEC's more varied
considerations are consistent with the SEC regulations' focus on confidential
business information rather than on the narrower subset of trade secrets. If
the Commission's FOIA Officer denies the request for confidential
treatment, the first appeal is to the Commission's General Counsel, and a
review of that decision can then be made by a U.S. district court.' '7 When
the General Counsel is notified within ten calendar days that the matter has
been appealed to federal court, the General Counsel should issue a stay on
disclosing the allegedly confidential records." 8 If the reviewing court
decides that, among other things, the agency's decision was "arbitrary,
capricious, [and] an abuse of discretion," the records will remain
confidential.' 19
c. FTC
Similar to the FDA and SEC, the FTC does not have the authority to
publically disclose trade secrets that have been submitted to it.120 The
prohibition against disclosure, however, does not apply to law enforcement
(domestic or foreign)' 2 ' or to Congress.' 2 2 The FTC may also disclose trade-
secret information to its contractors and consultants who are subject to the
same confidentiality restrictions as its employees.' 2 3 The process for
(iv) The adverse consequences to a business enterprise, financial or otherwise,
that would result from disclosure of confidential commercial or financial
information, including any adverse effect on the business' competitive position;
(v) The measures taken by the business to protect the confidentiality of the
commercial or financial information in question and of similar information, prior
to, and after, its submission to the Commission;
(vi) The ease or difficulty of a competitor's obtaining or compiling the
commercial or financial information;
(vii) Whether the commercial or financial information was voluntarily
submitted to the Commission and, if so, whether and how disclosure of the
information would tend to impede the availability of similar information to the
Commission;
(viii) The extent, if any, to which portions of the substantiation of the request
for confidential treatment should be afforded confidential treatment; and
(ix) Such additional facts and such legal and other authorities as the requesting
person may consider appropriate.
Id. § 2oo.8 3 (d) (2).
116. Id. § 2oo.83(d)(2)(V)-(Vi).
117. Id. § 2oo.83(e)(i).
118. - Id. § 200.83(C) (3).
119. 5 U.S.C. § 7o6(2)(A) (2006).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 4 6(f) (2006).
121. Id.§ 4 6(f)(1)-(2).
122. Id. § 5 7 b-2(d)(1) (A), (b) (3 ) (C).
123. 16 C.F.R. § 101 5 .11 (2010).
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disclosing confidential information is similar to the other agencies and in
compliance with FOIA.12 4 Once notified, if the submitter objects to the
disclosure of its trade secrets, the decision can be appealed to a U.S. district
court. 2 5
In determining what information qualifies as a trade secret, the FTC
regulations differ from both the FDA and the SEC. Rather than adopting
any of the six-factor test from the Restatement of Torts, the regulation looks
toward the more modern UTSA and lists as one of five factors1 6 whether
"the information so specified is commonly known within the industry or is
readily ascertainable by outside persons."127 It also calls for the submitter to
describe how releasing the information would cause competitive harm to the
company.128 In one other departure from the previously discussed agencies'
rules, the FTC regulations explicitly provide that the determination of
whether to disclose trade-secret information pursuant to FOIA will be based
on "the most authoritative judicial interpretations available at the time a
request for disclosure or production is considered."I 2 9 It further provides
that to the extent the secret information can be segregated from the
nonsecret information, a portion of the record may be disclosed to the
requester. 3 0
Of the agencies reviewed in this Article, the provisions of the FTC
regulations appear to be more closely tied to modem trade-secret principles
and to the proposed shield-or-disclose model.
124. See 16 C.F.R. § 1o 5 .18(b).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 57b-2(C).
126. The subsection provides as follows:
(c) Each request for exemption from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 5 5 2(b)( 4 ) as a
trade secret or privileged or confidential commercial or financial information
must:
(1) Specifically identify the exact portion(s) of the document claimed to be
confidential;
(2) State whether the information claimed to be confidential has ever been
released in any manner to a person who was not an employee or in a confidential
relationship with the company;
(3) State whether the information so specified is commonly known within the
industry or is readily ascertainable by outside persons with a minimum of time and
effort;
(4) State how release of the information so specified would be likely to cause
substantial harm to the company's competitive position; and
(5) State whether the submitter is authorized to make claims of confidentiality
on behalf of the person or organization concerned.
i6 C.F.R. § 1015.18(c).
127. Id. § 1015.18(c)(3).
128. Id. § 1015.18(c) (4).
129. Id. § 1015-19(a).
130. Id.
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d. EPA
The FDA, SEC, and FTC rules provide that confidentiality review would
be initiated only when prompted by a FOIA request.1'3 Unlike these other
agencies, the EPA's regulations provide that it can make determinations of
confidentiality when prompted to do so by a FOIA request, without any such
request, and when the EPA anticipates that it may receive a request for the
information at a future date. 3 2 In a nutshell, however, the EPA's procedure
for disclosure under FOIA is the same as the previously discussed agencies.
First, a party requesting information submits a request to the EPA.133
Next, the EPA office determines if the information is exempt from
disclosure as a trade secret.' 3 4 If the EPA determines that the information is
not confidential, the EPA gives the trade-secret owner an opportunity to
demonstrate to the EPA that the information is a trade secret.' 35 An EPA
legal office makes the EPA's final determination of whether or not
disclosure will be withheld.'36
The agency's criteria for determining whether to grant confidential
status to records invite the submitter to comment on nine factors. 37 This list
131. See, e.g., supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (FDA); supra note 113 and
accompanying text (SEC); supra note 124 and accompanying text (FTC).
132. 40 C.F.R. § 2.204(a) (2010).
133. The EPA has a control office for different categories of business information,
including confidential information. The EPA assigns responsibility for confidential information
to the control office. An EPA employee must first obtain the concurrence of the control office
before making information available to the public. 40 C.F.R. § 2.212 (2010).
134- 40 C.F.R. § 2.20 4 (d).
135. Id. § 2.20 4 (d)-(e).
136. 4 0 C.F.R. § 2.205(a) (2oo).
137- 40 C.F.R. § 2.204(e) provides as follows:
(4) The written notice required by paragraph (e) (i) of this section shall invite
the business's comments on the following points (subject to paragraph (e) (5) of
this section):
(i) The portions of the information which are alleged to be entitled to
confidential treatment;
(ii) The period of time for which confidential treatment is desired by the
business (e.g., until a certain date, until the occurrence of a specified event, or
permanently);
(iii) The purpose for which the information was furnished to EPA and the
approximate date of submission, if known;
(iv) Whether a business confidentiality claim accompanied the information
when it was received by EPA;
(v) Measures taken by the business to guard against undesired disclosure of the
information to others;
(vi) The extent to which the information has been disclosed to others, and the
precautions taken in connection therewith;
(vii) Pertinent confidentiality determinations, if any, by EPA or other Federal
agencies, and a copy of any such determination, or reference to it, if available;
(viii) Whether the business asserts that disclosure of the information would be
likely to result in substantial harmful effects on the business' [s] competitive
[Vol. g6:7g1814
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does not mirror that of the other agencies.'3 8 It contains two generally
recognizable trade-secret inquiries: (1) the measures taken by the company
to guard the secrecy of the information and (2) the extent to which the
information has been disclosed to others.139 On the likelihood that the
disclosure would result in harm, the provision here is more detailed,
requiring a showing of "substantial harmful effects on the business' [s]
competitive position" and "an explanation of the causal relationship
between disclosure" and the harm.140
Strangely, in a subsequent subpart, another EPA regulation governing
confidentiality discussions uses a different list for establishing
confidentiality,'4' requiring a showing of reasonable measures to protect
confidentiality and a showing that others cannot obtain the information by
legitimate means.'4 2 While there does not appear to be any significant
difference between these factors and those used in the other regulation, it is
odd that the same language (or list) was not used in both regulations to
establish the same principle.
D. Do COmPANIES HAVE REASON To BE CONCERNED?
The government collects an enormous amount of information from
companies that it stores, analyzes, and disseminates to government agencies,
other companies, and the public. 43 This practice increases the chances that
information disclosed to the government that should remain secret does
not. Accidental disclosures of confidential and trade-secret information
occur.'44 Over the last few years, several government agencies have
position, and if so, what those harmful effects would be, why they should be viewed
as substantial, and an explanation of the causal relationship between disclosure
and such harmful effects; and
(ix) Whether the business asserts that the information is voluntarily submitted
information as defined in § 2.201(i), and if so, whether and why disclosure of the
information would tend to lessen the availability to EPA of similar information in
the future.
40 C.F.R. § 2.204(e).
138. Seesupranotes g9 (FDA), 115 (SEC), and 126 (FIC).
139. 40 C.F.R. § 2.204(e) (4).
140. Id. § 2.204(e) (4) (viii).
141. 40 C.F.R. § 2.208 (2010).
142. Id. § 2.2o8(b)-(c).
143. See, e.g., Irvin B. Vann, Electronic Data Sharing in Public Sector Agencies, in HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS 249, 249 (Christopher M. Shear & G. David Garson eds., 3 d ed.
2010).
144. See, e.g., Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3 d 1249, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(discussing how trade secrets and confidential information for the thyroid drug Unithroid were
accidentally posted on an FDA website for five months); B&J Oil & Gas v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 353 F-3 d 71, 74 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (recounting how the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission ("FERC") accidentally posted a gas company's confidential
information); HiRel Connectors, Inc. v. United States, No. CVoi-n 1o69 DSF VBKX, 2oo6 WL
2o01] 8 15
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inappropriately handled or inadvertently disclosed company trade secrets.
The EPA alone has been the subject of three litigated cases that have
resulted in written opinions,'4 5 and one more recent case."46 In one case,
for example, the EPA disclosed one organization's trade secrets to an
environmental organization.14 7 In another case, the agency is accused of
disclosing trade secrets to a newspaper.4 8 The FERC also inadvertently
posted a company's confidential information on a publicly accessible
information system.149 The FDA has been accused of inappropriately
disclosing to a prisoner the secret formula to a drug'50 and posting on its
website another company's trade secrets contained in a New Drug
Application.' 5 '
Beyond the inadvertent disclosures of trade secrets, there are other
means by which the government could release trade secrets. These include,
for instance, disclosures made by the government in conducting its business
with vendors,152 disclosures mandated by statute,' 53 disclosures made
pursuant to FOIA,'54 and perhaps even intentional leaks made to the media
or other outlet.5 5 FOIA "is the root of the threat and of the risk" in
361 8oi (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2006) (examining allegations of trade-secret misappropriation
involving disclosures of missile part specifications over the Internet and through responses to
RFPs); Myers v. Williams, 819 F. Supp. 919, 920-21 (D. Or. 1993) (describing how the FDA
accidentally disclosed the formula for Upjohn's sleeping pill Halcion to a prisoner who claimed
the drug caused him to break the law; Upjohn obtained an injunction barring the prisoner
from selling the formula to Upjohn's competitor).
145. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. EPA,
286 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Masonite Corp. v. Cnty. of Mendocino Air Quality Mgmt. Dist.,
49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (Ct. App. 1996).
146. N. Coast Rivers Alliance v. Johnson, No. 4:08 cv-05328 SBA (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009)
(dismissed by stipulation of the parties).
147. Nat'l WildlifeFed'n, 286 F.3 d at 574.
148. N. Coast Rivers Alliance, No. 4:o8 cv-05328 SBA.
149. B&J Oil & Gas, 353 F-3 d at 74.
150. Myers v. Williams, 81g F. Supp. 919, 920 (D. Or. 1993).
151. Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
152. See, e.g., Secure Servs. Tech., Inc. v. Time & Space Processing, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1354,
1357-65 (E.D. Va. 1989) (discussing a situation between two vendors where the government
loaned the defendant one of plaintiffs fax machines to achieve compatibility between the
machines, and no trade-secret violation was found since plaintiff had not prohibited the
government from sharing the machine with an agreement).
153. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 994-95 (1984) (discussing
forced revelation of trade-secret information by amendment to Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act).
154. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 285 (1979); Doe v. Veneman, 38o
F.3 d 807, 81o (5 th Cir. 2004); Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1290
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 681 F.2d 161, 162 (3 d Cir. 1982).
155. These kinds of intentional disclosures, if made by a government employee whose
identity can be ascertained, could lead to possible criminal liability. See Economic Espionage Act
of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2006); Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2006).
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protecting trade secrets that are in the government's hands.5 6 For many
years now, companies have been fearful and mindful of the large amount of
information accessible to competitors and the public through FOIA.'57
Indeed it is believed that most FOIA requests for business information come
from competitors.'58 Even outside of FOLA, another gaping risk comes from
Congress. Not only do the agency-protection rules not apply to Congress,
but a member of Congress could destroy a trade secret, for instance, by
making it public under the Speech or Debate'59 Clause.16 o
There is also the problem that a trade-secret owner does not know for
certain upon submitting the information whether the agency will ultimately
agree to treat it as confidential and not disclose it. That is because the
determination of protective status is generally not made until a FOIA request
has been received.',6 The FDA regulations, for instance, provide that if a
regulation is issued specifying that certain categories of records should be
disclosed, then the agency may produce the documents without providing
notice and opportunity to object to the submitter.' 62 If an agency refuses to
classify information as a trade secret, the company can challenge the
decision under section 1o(e) of the APA.' 63 This section authorizes the
court to set aside an agency decision that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."' 6 4 Not only is this a
difficult standard to meet for one seeking reversal of an agency decision, but
the agency also benefits from the courts' deference to its decision.' 65
Moreover, in some agencies, the procedure by which an agency
determines whether information qualifies as a trade secret is quite informal,
without a hearing "on the record."' 6 6 A company may not even know the
identity of the person or persons within the agency who made the decision,
or the person's expertise in making these kinds of decisions.' 67 Nor does the
person making the decision have access to all of the relevant information
with which to make the determination. Unlike in the litigation context,
there is no adversary who can challenge or produce additional information
156. Wearly v. FTC, 462 F. Supp. 589, 6o (D.N.J. 1978), vacated, 616 F.2d 662 (d Cir.
1980) (holding that the matter was not ripe for judicial review).
157. See, e.g., Connelly, supra note 49, at 208.
158. See, e.g., id. at 209.
159. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. i.
16o. See Wearly, 462 F. Supp. at 6o n. 13 (discussing Senator Joseph McCarthy's classic use
of the Speech or Debate Clause).
161. See supra text accompanying note 113.
162. 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(f)( 3 ) (2010).
163- 5 U.S.C. § 7o6 (2006).
164. Id.§7o6(2)(A).
165. See Zotos Int'l, Inc. v. Young, 83o F.2d 350, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
166. See id. at 353 (discussing the FDA's procedure).
167. Id. at 35 3 - 5 4 .
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on the alleged trade-secret status of the information.'6 8 This places the
agency in the role of opposing counsel and judge simultaneously, adding
even more weight to the agency's discretion.
Where the government makes it mandatory to submit information, a
company could refuse to submit its trade secrets to the government and thus
choose not to do business in the U.S. market.'6 9 Therefore, a company is
forced to choose between its livelihood or what may be a waiver of its
constitutional right not to be subject to a taking.'7 0 In Phillip Morris, Inc. v.
Reilly, for instance, the court held that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
could not condition the company's right to sell cigarettes in Massachusetts
on the company's disclosing its ingredient list (a trade secret) to the
Commonwealth.'7' However, the alternative to this rather unappealing
option could be to disclose the information only if deemed necessary by a
court under promises of confidentiality and only so much as is necessary to
meet the underlying regulatory interests. The proposal set forth in this
Article presents one step toward reaching that middle ground.
III. APPROACHES TO ORDERING PRODUCTION OF TRADE SECRETS
For additional guidance on the question of when the government
should be entitled to take trade-secret information, I will now consider cases
that address, in other contexts, when one party can be ordered to produce
its trade secrets to another. Similar to the company-to-government level of
exchange that is the focus of this Article, these cases involve, for instance,
discovery of trade secrets in pending litigation between parties. Moreover,
an additional body of cases involving disclosure of trade secrets by the
government to the public is also considered. Lessons from these cases
ultimately help frame my shield-or-disclose model.
There is no coherent or consistent approach in the case law that courts
use to decide when to compel a party to produce its trade secrets to the
government. Rather, courts tend to use a more contextual approach based
on the circumstances or setting that the case presents. Accordingly, I have
categorized and analyzed the cases into three categories to better
understand the general approach for each group. By identifying what are
essentially the "best practices" from these categories, I was better able to
168. See Mary L. Lyndon, Secrecy and Access in an Innovation Intensive Economy: Reordering
Information Privileges in Environmental, Health, and Safety Law, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 465, 502-o3
(2007) (arguing that these dynamics in the regulatory context favor secrecy).
169. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. g86, 1007 (1984) (noting that Monsanto
willingly bore the burden of disclosure to the government in exchange for "the ability to market
pesticides in this country").
170. See Janka, supra note 51, at 355 (discussing why this kind of choice may not be
permitted under the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, "which prevents the government
from conditioning the receipt of public benefits on an individual's willingness to waive his
constitutional rights").
171. 312 F.3 d 24, 46-47 (Ist Cir. 2002).
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construct a more principled and structured approach for the refusal-to-
submit cases. After discussing each of the categories, Part III.B will
summarize the shortcomings from these various approaches.
A. CASE REVIEW
The cases are divided into three categories with lines drawn mostly
around who the parties are in relation to each other and the procedural
context in which the cases arise. First are the private-party cases that involve
discovery disputes between private (nongovernmental) parties to litigation,
where trade secrets have been placed at issue in the case or in discovery.
One party seeks to discover information that the other party claims is a trade
secret, and the court must rule on a motion to compel. Second are the
government cases, where the government is a party to the litigation and a
request has been made for production of trade secrets outside the FOIA
context. The final category comprises the reverse-FOIA cases, where a
company is objecting to production of its trade secrets to a third-party FOIA
requestor. Each category is described in turn below. Following the
discussion, the next Subpart pulls together the principles from these cases
and explains why they are inadequate approaches for the refusal-to-submit
cases.
1. Private-Party Cases
The private-party cases mostly involve discovery disputes. Typically, a
party to litigation seeks to discover alleged trade secrets from another party
during the course of the litigation. The private-party cases differ from the
refusal-to-submit cases because of the nature of the relationship between the
parties. In private-party cases, the parties have more "voluntarily" entered
into a relationship; often they are competitors or have a previously existing
relationship, and the question of producing a trade secret arises as a
discovery dispute in a pending action.1 72 In private-party litigation, trade
secrets have either been allegedly misappropriated, or they are relevant to
an issue in the litigation (for instance, product-litigation cases).173
Accordingly, the trade secrets have been placed at issue in the litigation, and
they are relevant to an issue or claim in contention. Even in the private-party
discovery disputes, the courts are more protective toward permitting
172. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288,
289-go (D. Del. 1985) (action between Coca-Cola and its bottlers, wherein bottlers sought to
compel production of the complete formula of Coke).
173. See, e.g., Snowden ex rel. Victor v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 136 F.R.D. 694, 69ao70 (D.
Kan. 1991) (granting motion to compel disclosure of trade secrets relating to vaccine in a
products-liability action); Kleinerman v. U.S. Postal Serv., loo F.R.D. 66, 69-70 (D. Mass. 1983)
(granting motion to compel disclosure of trade secrets where central to plaintiffs theory of
trade-secret misappropriation).
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discovery of third parties who are not a party to the litigation and are far less
likely to compel disclosure of their trade secrets.' 74
The courts' approaches to solving these disputes and determining
whether to compel disclosure of trade-secret information are often guided
by the discovery and evidentiary rules. In such instances, the party from
whom the information is sought will request a protective order from the
court to avoid production. Within the scheme of evidentiary and discovery
privileges, there is no absolute privilege for not disclosing trade secrets.' 75
However, unless the trade-secret owner seeks to "conceal fraud or otherwise
work injustice," the trade-secret owner has a qualified privilege to resist
discovery if such disclosure will cause harm. 176
Following an evidentiary-law framework, the trade-secret owner
generally must first show that the information is indeed a trade secret and
that disclosure of the trade secret might be harmful.77 The "trade secret"
privilege in the context of the law of evidence recognizes the fact that
disclosure of the trade-secret information destroys the value of the property.
When balancing the need for the evidence against the trade-secret owner's
property right, it is treated as a qualified privilege insofar as disclosure is
compelled only under the control of a protective order.'7 8 Although a party
may have a legitimate interest in protecting its trade secrets, "that interest
must yield to the right of the plaintiff to discover the full truth of the facts
involved in the issues of the case" where "the issues cannot be fairly
adjudicated unless this information is available."1 79
Procedurally, the burden then shifts to the party seeking discovery of
the trade secret to demonstrate that the trade secret is relevant and
necessary to the litigation.1so Once relevance and need are established, the
trade secret will be disclosed barring an "unreasonable, oppressive,
annoying, or embarrassing" subpoena.s'8 It is entirely within the
174. See, e g., Snowden, 136 F.R.D. at 699 (noting that the trade secrets of a third party "are
entitled to greater protection" and did not have to be disclosed). In the refusal-to-submit cases,
however, there is no business relationship or litigation pending between the company and the
government. This should suggest a more cautious approach to compelling production in the
refusal-to-submit cases.
175. Upjohn Co. v. Hygieia Biological Labs., 151 F.R.D. 355, 358-59 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
176. Id. at 358 (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. Id.
178. Wearly v. IFTC, 462 F. Supp. 589, 594 (D.N.J. 1978), vacated, 616 F.2d 662 (3 d Cir.
1980).
179. Melori Shoe Corp. v. Pierce & Stevens, Inc., 14 F.R.D. 346, 347 (D. Mass. 1953).
s8o. Id.; see, e.g., Hartley Pen Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Cal., 287 F.2d 324
(gth Cir. 1961) (seeking to compel party to answer interrogatories that would reveal its trade
secrets).
181. Centurion Indus., Inc. v. Warren Steurer & Assocs., 665 F.2d 323, 326 (lOth Cir.
1981).
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sound discretion of the trial court to decide whether trade secrets
are relevant and whether the need outweighs the harm of
disclosure. Likewise, if the trade secrets are deemed relevant and
necessary, the appropriate safeguards that should attend their
disclosure by means of a protective order are also a matter within
the trial court's discretion.182
The courts consider a wide range of factors that are neither definitive
nor exhaustive in deciding whether good cause exists to grant a protective
order. As part of the inquiry, some courts consider whether the information
qualifies as a trade secret. 83 While some courts consider the purpose for
which the information is sought,, 84 others consider relevance, necessity, and
whether potential harm outweighs the need for the information.'85 The
courts will often balance the requesting party's need for the information
against the injury that might result if disclosure is permitted.' 8 6 Generally,
unless the risk of harm to the trade-secret owner outweighs the need for
discovery (an unlikely event given the liberal discovery rules), the court will
compel disclosure.' 8 7 Pursuant to Rule 26(c) (7), the court will then craft a
protective order with appropriate safeguards to govern the scope and
manner of the disclosure.' 88
2. Government Cases
Like the private-party cases, this category of cases sheds light on some
courts' approaches in discovery-type disputes between the government and a
company (outside of a FOIA request). The courts in these cases tend to
focus more on relevance than on the trade-secret status of the information
sought. They almost always rule in favor of disclosure. For example, in
Kleinerman v. United States Postal Service, the court granted a government
contractor's motion to compel production of documents that included
confidential technical reports and proposals.' 89 Without actually engaging
in an analysis of whether these documents are trade secrets, the court
182. Id.
183. See State ex reL Johnson v. Tsapis, 419 S.E.2d 1, 3 (W. Va. 1992) (applying the
Restatement of Torts's six-factor test to determine whether there is good cause under Rule
26(c)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., Snowden ex ret Victor v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 136 F.R.D. 694, 698 (D. Kan.
199); Premier Election Solutions, Inc. v. SysTest Labs Inc., Civil Action No. o-cv-o1822-WDM-
KMT, 2009 WL 3075597, at *8 (D. Colo. Sept. 22, 2009).
186. Pochat v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. Civ. o8-5 oi 5 -KES, 2008 WL 5192427, at
*3-4 (D.S.D. Dec. 11, 2oo8).
187. Id.at*io--11.
188. Centurion Indus., Inc. v. Warren Steurer & Assocs., 665 F.2d 323, 326 (ioth Cir.
1981); see Pochat, 2oo8 WL 5 19 24 27, at *4.
189. ioo F.R.D. 66 (D. Mass. 1983).
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collapsed the trade-secret analysis into the determination of relevancy. 190
Additionally, the court stated that the defendants had not provided
adequate proof of harm from disclosure.191
In the government cases, the analysis tends to focus very little, if at all,
on whether the information at issue qualifies as a trade secret. While
recommending consideration of a host of factors,1 92 one court recognized
the importance of a threshold determination of trade secrecy in analyzing
whether to permit disclosure. In Chevron, the plaintiff sued for declaratory
and injunctive relief against the threatened disclosure of test data on
fungicides and insecticides submitted to the EPA.'93 Chevron claimed that
the test data constituted trade secrets.' 94 In deciding to release the data, the
EPA had not made a determination of whether the information qualified for
trade-secret protection. 195 The court held that the EPA should have
determined the trade-secret status of the data, and the agency's failure to do
so was an arbitrary and capricious exercise of its judgment.,96 Similarly, in
Mobay Chemical Corp. v. Costle, the court remanded the case back to the EPA
to determine whether the environmental safety data submitted by the
plaintiff is a "trade secret" according to the Restatement of Torts
definition.197 In another case where the government sought an order to
allow it to inspect defendants' business premises, the court engaged in
balancing between the government-plaintiff's need for information and the
harms that could come from disclosure of defendant's trade secrets.'9 8 The
court allowed inspection of the process but did not analyze whether a trade
secret existed. 199 It was satisfied that the government's stipulation not to
reveal the trade secrets was adequate protection.2 0
igo. Id. at 69-70.
191. Seeid.at 70.
192. Among the factors were "the various policies underlying the [Federal Environmental
Pesticide Control Act], such as the promotion of research, the interest in competition, the
protection of public health and the environment, and the improvement of pesticides, as well as
other governmental interests." Chevron Chem. Co. v. Costle, 443 F. Supp. 1024, 1032 (N.D.
Cal. 1978).
193. Id. at 102 5.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1032.
196. Id.
197. 447 F. Supp. 8 I 1, 835 (W.D. Mo. 1978); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. Costle, 464 F. Supp.
395 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (remanding to the agency to determine whether trade secrets existed
according to the Restatement ofTorts's definition).
198. United States v. Nat'l Steel Corp., 26 F.R.D. 603 (S.D. Tex. 96o).
199. See id.
200. See id.
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3. Reverse-FOIA Cases
Trade-secret litigation filed to prevent the government from releasing
information pursuant to a FOIA request is known as a "reverse FOIA"
action. 2 0 ' Thus, if an agency makes a final determination that the
information does not fall within Exemption 4 of FOIA, and thus must be
disclosed, the submitter may sue the agency in federal court under the
APA.2 0 2 In reviewing the agency's action under the APA, the court will
examine the record developed by the agency to determine whether the
agency's actions were arbitrary and capricious.2o 3 The court must first
establish that the threshold requirements of Exemption 4 are present2o4 by
establishing that the information was obtained from a person2 0 5 and that the
information is financial in character.2o 6 If these threshold requirements are
met, the court must next determine whether the information was required
or voluntarily submitted.2 07
The determination whether information was voluntarily submitted is
the most important analytical step in a reverse-FOLA case. The required
voluntary finding establishes which test will be applied for the finding of
confidentiality under Exemption 4.208 There are no clear rules for
distinguishing what was voluntary from what was required.2 0 9 A court order
to compel production would seem to fall under the "required" category.210
However, submissions in response to an agency subpoena are not necessarily
compulsory.2 1' Court enforcement of the subpoena, if granted, would make
it required.2 1 2 Some agencies' regulations take on the task of defining a
voluntary submission. The EPA, for example, defines "voluntarily submitted
information" as:
201. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 285 (1979) ("This case belongs to a class
that has been popularly denominated 'reverse-FOIA' suits.").
202. 5 U.S.C. H§ 701-7o6 (2oo6); see cases cited supra note 89.
203. See cases cited supra note 91.
204. 5 U.S.C. § 5 5 2 (b) (4) (2o6), amended by OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-175, 121 Stat. 2524.
205. See, e.g., Buffalo Evening News, Inc. v. Small Bus. Ass'n, 666 F. Supp. 467, 469
(W.D.N.Y. 1987).
206. See, e.g., Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 588 F.2d 863, 870 (2d Cir. 1978).
207. See Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that voluntarily submitted information to the government will be
treated as confidential if it is not ordinarily public).
208. Parker v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 141 F. Supp. 2d 71, 77 (D.D.C. 2001).
209. Some courts have held that the government must actually exercise its authority to
compel submission of the information beyond the issuance of a subpoena in order to be
considered mandatory under National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C.
Cir. 1974). See Inner City Press/Cmty. on the Move v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
463 F. 3 d 239, 246 (2d Cir. 2oo6); Parker, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 78 n.6.
210. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. EEOC, 922 F. Supp. 235, 242 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
211. Id.
212. Id.
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[B]usiness information in the EPA's possession-
(1) [T]he submission of which [the] EPA had no statutory or
contractual authority to require; and
(2) The submission of which was not prescribed by statute or
regulation as a condition of obtaining some benefit (or avoiding
some disadvantage) under a regulatory program of general
applicability, including such regulatory programs as permit,
licensing, registration, or certification programs, but excluding
programs concerned solely or primarily with the award or
administration by [the] EPA of contracts or grants.2 1 3
If the court determines that the information was required, the court
applies the National Parks analysis to determine whether the information is
confidential.2 1 4 This test provides that material is only protected by
Exemption 4 from disclosure if either (1) disclosure would "impair the
Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future," or (2)
disclosure would "cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the
person from whom the information was obtained."215 If the court
determines that the information was voluntarily submitted, then it applies
the Critical Mass analysis to determine whether the information is
confidential.2, 6 This is an easier standard that calls for protection from
disclosure under Exemption 4 as long as the information is (1) commercial
or financial and (2) "not customarily [made] available to the public." 2 17 If
the court determines that the information is confidential under Critical
Mass, it does not disclose the information.218 As then-Judge Ginsburg
observed, this test removes an "independent judicial check on the
reasonableness of the provider's custom" and is subject to abuse.2 1 9
Neither test requires proof of trade secrecy. Confidentiality is enough.
The National Parks test, however, has a substantial competitive-harm
requirement, which has some semblance of a trade-secret test. However, the
precise contours of that test are not entirely clear, and a party opposing
disclosure need not show actual competitive harm; instead, only a likelihood
of such harm would be sufficient.22 0 The harm is limited to business harm
213. 40 C.F.R. § 2.201(i) (2010).
214. See Nat'l Parks, 498 F.2d 765.
215. Id. at 770; McDonnell Douglas, 922 F. Supp. at 241.
216. Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (en banc).
217. Id. at 872; McDonnell Douglas, 922 F. Supp. at 241.
218. McDonnell Douglas, 922 F. Supp. at 241.
219. CriticalMass, 975 F.2d at 883 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
220. Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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caused by competitors rather than harm resulting from other reasons, such
as negative information about the company.2 21
The voluntary-required test does, however, reflect certain policy choices
and values that seek to balance the governmental interests and business'
proprietary interests. When the government obtains information by force, it
needs to ensure that the information is nonetheless reliable; when, however,
the information is voluntarily provided, the government needs to ensure its
continued availability.222 As the court noted in Critical Mass, "the disclosure
of information the Government has secured from voluntary sources on a
confidential basis will both jeopardize its continuing ability to secure such
data on a cooperative basis and injure the provider's interest in preventing
its unauthorized release."223
B. UNsurrABILTnY OFEXISTINGAPPROACHES
The courts' analytical approaches to determine when trade secrets
should be produced are varied and inconsistent. Thus, a wholesale adoption
of any of the existing approaches would not be suitable for the refusal-to-
submit cases. In the private-party discovery cases, the courts appear to rely
mostly on the definition of trade secrets provided in the UTSA and on the
discovery rules in deciding when to compel disclosure of an alleged trade
secret. The fact that the discovery rules are generally interpreted liberally in
favor of disclosure means that the outcomes in those cases tend to favor
disclosure. Even in the private-party discovery disputes, the courts are more
protective toward permitting discovery of third parties who are not a party to
the litigation and are far less likely to compel disclosure of their trade
secrets.2 24 Often there is a confidentiality agreement or other agreement
between the third party and one of the parties, and the courts would not
permit the party in litigation to violate that agreement for the benefit of
another party to the litigation."25 This practice therefore leans toward and
supports a more restrictive, rather than permissive, approach to ordering
production of trade secrets to the government.
The government cases follow closely the private-party discovery cases in
that the courts tend to order disclosure. However, the analysis in the
221. See, e.g., Connelly, supra note 49, at 235. In one case, the court stated that the ease-of-
reverse-engineering factor from the Restatement of Torts will have bearing on the "substantial
competitive harm" test. See Worthington Compressors, Inc. v. Costle, 662 F.2d 45, 52-53 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
222. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 878.
223. Id. at 879.
224. Snowden ex reL Victor v. Connaught Labs., Inc, 136 F.R.D. 694, 699-700 (D. Kan.
1991); Premier Election Solutions, Inc. v. SysTest Labs Inc., Civil Action No. og-cv-o1822-WDM-
KMT, 2009 WL 3075597, at *1o (D. Colo. Sept. 22, 2009) (denying motion to compel
nonparty to produce trade-secret information).
225. See, e.g., Premier Election Solutions, 2009 WL 3075597, at *io.
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government cases tends to focus very little, if at all, on whether the
information at issue qualifies as a trade secret.22 6 Rather, the focus appears
to be on relevance. If the court deemed the alleged trade-secret information
relevant to the government's request, then disclosure was ordered or
condoned without paying much attention to its trade-secret status.2 2 7 Finally,
the focus in the FOIA cases tends to be on the government agency's actions
and on whether the agency created the appropriate record rather than on a
trade-secret analysis.22 8 The substantive analysis is driven by whether the
information was required or submitted voluntarily to the government.22 9
Accordingly, the trade-secret status of the information carries almost no
relevance.
It is also interesting that the approach to resolve reverse-FOIA cases
applies a standard that is in some ways inconsistent with the agencies'
regulatory standards for protecting trade secret and confidential
information. That is because the FOIA standard exempts a class of
proprietary information much broader than what would be defined as a
"trade secret" under the common law. 2 3 0 This is ironic because since FOIA is
a disclosure statute, one would expect that a narrower definition of a trade
secret would be more in keeping with its legislative mandate.2 3 ' When,
however, the agencies are applying their regulations to determine whether
information should be protected from disclosure, they are likely using a
more restrictive test. Thus, where an agency defines a trade secret based on
the Restatement of Torts, a submitter may not be able to persuade the
agency that its data meet that standard. However, under FOIA, which does
not use a Restatement of Torts definition for Exemption 4 status, the data
could be protected. This inconsistency begs the question whether agencies
should just incorporate the FOIA standard as interpreted by the courts,
rather than having a complicated body of regulations governing
confidentiality that ultimately is not consistent with the FOIA case law.232
IV. STRIKING THE BALANCE IN DISCLOSING TO THE GOVERNMENT
The unique nature of trade secrets-that they exist only so long as they
are not disclosed or disclosed in confidence-requires an arrangement that
226. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
227. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
228. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
229. See discussion supra Part III.A.3 .
230. See supra notes 214-20 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., Connelly, supra note 49, at 235. This broad exemption for trade secret and
confidential information is probably further motivation for the Obama Administration's push
to encourage a policy in favor of greater disclosure under FOIA. Memorandum on the Freedom
of Information Act, 2009 DAILY COMP. PREs. Doc. g (Jan. 21, 2009).
232. The EPA, for instance, has incorporated the FOIA test in its regulations. See infra text
accompanying note 244.
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ensures against accidental, unauthorized, or other improper disclosure.233
The owner of trade-secret information should never make a disclosure,
either voluntary or involuntary, without enforceable restrictions against
general disclosure. However, when it is determined that it is in the public's
interest that the information be disclosed to the government, a delicate
balance must be observed. In some cases, the need for the information is not
so important as to warrant disclosure of the trade secret. In those cases it
may be fair and adequate to withhold disclosure. In other cases, the trade-
secret information is necessary and vital, and thus, disclosure is justified if
sufficient safeguards are in place to protect the information and limit
dissemination. This serves the needs of the government (and the underlying
regulation or proceeding) while protecting the interests of the trade-secret
owner.
To achieve the above goals, a clear model is needed to determine when
trade-secret information should be submitted to the government in the first
place.2 34 This model therefore addresses disclosure to the government, not
the subsequent and separate step of disclosure by the government to the
public. The latter is already addressed, albeit not perfectly, in the elaborate
regulatory scheme of agency rules and regulations, as well as in the reverse-
FOIA case law.2 35 Thus, once the government has the information in its
possession, whether received voluntarily or through compliance mandates,
the current regulations are applicable to protecting them.
A. THE SHIELD-OR-DISCLOSE MODEL
The shield-or-disclose proposal focuses on why and when the
government should obtain a company's trade secrets. The body of law that
would allow corporations to refuse to submit proprietary information to the
government is trade-secret law, which protects trade secrets-not the
broader category of confidential information. Because of the dearth of case
law and other guidance specifically relevant to refusal-to-submit cases, I have
considered a wider body of cases that implicate disclosures of trade secret by
the government as well as disclosures made in the context of pending
233. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
234. Of course, this Article assumes the difficult circumstance where a government
regulation does not require that the information in question be produced. Indeed, in the real-
life Toyota situation, the NHTSA had issued a rule requiring that manufacturers who included
black boxes in vehicles must make tools available to these vehicle owners to download and read
the data recorded in the boxes. However, the rule will not be implemented until 2012. See
Dionne Searcey & Kate Linebaugh, Toyota Woes Put Focus on Black Box, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14,
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SBiooo424052748703562404575067680423734178.
html. Even if it had been in effect, it is unclear whether such a regulation granting access to
individual vehicle owners would affect Toyota's obligation to produce the data to the
government.
235. See supra Parts II.C, III.A.3 .
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litigation. The end result is what I will refer to as the "shield-or-disclose"
model.
The shield-or-disclose model is inspired by the general approach that
has been adapted in the private-party and government discovery cases. It is
further infused with greater specificity and detail that is best suited for the
kinds of considerations that are present in trade-secret cases. It also makes
clear the roles and burdens to be assumed by the various players. It requires
a threshold determination that the information in question qualifies for
trade-secret protection under the common law. This helps reduce potential
abuses by companies that may seek protection for information that is merely
confidential but does not meet the requisite criteria for trade secrecy.236
However, mindful of the risk that trade-secret information submitted to the
government could be disclosed to the public, and thus have its secrecy be
destroyed, the shield-or-disclose model requires evidence of need, relevance,
and potential harm before a court could order disclosure.
If the trade-secret owner is able to meet its burden and establish the
trade-secret status of the information, then many other questions follow.
Ultimately, the proposal creates a procedural and substantive path to
identify the circumstances under which a court should compel a trade-secret
holder to produce its trade secret to the government. As a general policy
matter, when the public interest in the disclosure outweighs the harm to the
company from disclosure, the court may justifiably compel disclosure. What
does that mean, however? How is it determined? These are the questions for
which this framework aims to provide guidance. It is, admittedly, not the
sole answer, but rather a modest step in the direction of achieving a more
principled approach to refusal-to-submit cases, a step that is grounded in
trade-secret law and consistent with the policy considerations that underlie
governmental access and disclosure.
1. Company Establishes Trade-Secret Status and Harm
The first step of the process, having both procedural and substantive
significance, requires that the trade-secret owner establish that the requested
information qualifies for trade-secret protection and that harm will result
from disclosure of the trade secret to the government. Whether the
information in question meets the status of a "trade secret" should always be
the threshold question, and it is the trade-secret owner's burden to make
that showing.2 37 While companies often try to claim protection for
confidential and proprietary business information, trade-secret protection
applies only to the smaller subset of information that qualifies as an actual
236. SeeVSL Corp. v. Gen. Techs. Inc., 4 6.U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1356, 1360 (N.D. Cal. 1998)
(finding plaintiff's trade-secret claim to be specious where it had been careless about guarding
the alleged secret).
237. See Rowe, supra note 24, at 1447 (discussing the substantive legal standard for a
plaintiff in a trade-secret action).
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trade secret.238 Therefore, in most cases, this first question could be
determinative of the entire issue of disclosure because if the information is
not a trade secret, then that significantly weakens the argument against
disclosure.23 9 If the trade-secret owner is unable to establish trade-secret
status, then the inquiry likely ends in favor of the government. 240
Returning to the Toyota hypothetical, assume that Toyota refuses to
produce the black box encryption code and the data in the black box to the
government. Toyota would need to prove that the encryption code and
information each separately are protectable trade secrets. The company
might have an easier time proving that the encryption code is a trade secret,
assuming that it never released the code to anyone outside of the company.
However, there might be some debate about whether Toyota can claim as a
trade secret the information in the black box, which was sold to the
consumer as part of the vehicle. 2 4 1 Furthermore, to the extent any of the
information was already revealed publicly elsewhere, it would not continue
to qualify for trade-secret protection. 242  Accordingly, much more
clarification and evidence would be needed to determine precisely what
Toyota claims as a trade secret.
The trade-secret owner must then articulate the competitive harm that
would be caused from disclosure of the information to the government. This
is in keeping with trade-secret law's focus on protecting against unfair
competition and the existing articulation of harm in some of the regulations
as competitive harm. For example, SEC regulations require that a business
provide information regarding the adverse consequences that could result
from disclosure of confidential information, including any adverse effect on
238. To create a protectable trade secret, it is essential that a plaintiff take affirmative steps
to preserve the confidentiality of the alleged secret information. See, e.g., Niemi v. Am. Axle
Mfg. & Holding, Inc., No. 269155, 2007 WL 29383, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2007); Dicks
v.Jensen, 768 A.2d 1279, 1284 (Vt. -2001) (granting summaryjudgment in favor of defendant
where there was "no evidence in the record that plaintiff took any measures to indicate that the
customer list was confidential").
239. See Zotos Int'l, Inc. v. Young, 830 F.2d 350, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (using Restatement
of Torts's six factors to determine whether the information qualified as trade secret).
240. While the default rule could be a presumption in favor of disclosure for non-trade-
secret confidential information, it could be a rebuttable presumption. Courts could use their
discretion to do otherwise depending on the compelling nature of the remaining proof of
harm, relevance, and need.
241. See Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3 d 1178, 1203-04 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (finding that customers who purchased garage door openers were authorized under the
copyright laws to use the copy of the embedded software that they purchased). In addition,
some state laws make data from event data recorders the property of the vehicle owner. See Tim
Sramcik, 'Black Box' Information Driving Convictions, ABRN (Oct. 3, 2005), http://www.search-
autoparts.com/searchautoparts/article/articleDetailjsp?id= 184135.
242. See Underwater Storage v. U.S. Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 950, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
("Once the secret is published to the 'whole world,' . . . it loses its protected status and becomes
available to others for use and copying without fear of legal reprisal from the original
possessor."); Lockridge v. Tweco Prods., Inc., 497 P.2d 131, 134 (Kan. 1972).
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its competitive position.243 Similarly, on the likelihood that the disclosure
would result in harm, EPA regulations require a showing of "substantial
harmful effects to the business' competitive position" and "an explanation of
the causal relationship between disclosure" and the harm. 244 Moreover, in
the FOIA context, competitive harm has been interpreted to mean that the
harm flows directly from a competitor rather than from a customer or
employee or other source.245 Thus, a trade-secret owner would need to
establish the likelihood that such harm would occur if the information it
produced to the government were to be obtained by its competitors.
2. Government Establishes Relevance and Need
Once the trade-secret owner has established the trade-secret status of
the information and the harm that is likely to result from its disclosure, the
burden then shifts to the party requesting the information (i.e., the
government) to prove relevance and need for the information. This is
similar to the good-cause burden under the discovery rules.246 Given the
unique nature of a protectable trade secret and the devastating harm that
could result from its disclosure, 247 the better policy is that a trade secret
should not be ordered produced unless the actual trade secret (as opposed
to some other information related to the trade secret) is directly relevant to
the inquiry for which it is sought.248 In the Toyota hypothetical, for instance,
if the government requested the encryption code in an effort to determine
whether the cars subject to recall were all equipped with black boxes, a court
could find insufficient relevance.
Relevance, for the purposes of this proposal, is similar to the standard
that has been used in the discovery cases. 249 However, relevance should
probably not be interpreted as broadly for trade-secret purposes as it is
under the discovery rules. Whereas the underlying rules and policies in the
discovery context favor greater disclosure between the parties, trade-secret
law, on the other hand, is grounded in secrecy and the requirement that
trade secrets should not be disclosed without appropriate assurances of
243. 17 C.F.R. § 200.8 3 (d) (2) (iV) (2010).
244. 40 C.F.R. § 2.204(e)(4)(viii) (2010).
245. See Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
246. See Premier Election Solutions, Inc. v. SysTest Labs Inc., Civil Action No. o9-cv-o1822-
WDM-KMT, 2009 WL 3075597, at *7-8 (D. Colo. Sept. 22, 2009) (discussing a burden shift to
the party seeking discovery to establish that disclosure of a trade secret is relevant and
necessary).
247. See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Introducing a Takedown for Trade Secrets on the Internet, 2007 Wis.
L. REV. 1041, 1049-50 (discussing the importance of trade secrets to the economy and the
harm from disclosure).
248. See Premier Election SolutionS, 2009 WL 3075597, at *109 (refusing to order production
of trade-secret information "in light of the minimal relevancy of the information ... to the
underlying case").
249. See supra notes 18o-82 and accompanying text.
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confidentiality by the receiver. 250 Accordingly, this might suggest that the
relevance standard should be interpreted narrower than under the discovery
rules. The current FOIA rules and cases do not require that the party
requesting information from the governmental agency establish
relevance.25' However, given the higher scrutiny that should be given to the
disclosure of trade secrets, it makes sense to require a showing of relevance.
While the FOIA rules do not require a showing of need either, evidence
of need is required under my proposal. The government requestor should
demonstrate need for the information separate and apart from relevance.252
This inquiry would focus on such considerations as: (1) whether the
information sought is available elsewhere; (2) whether acceptable substitutes
for the information can be found from other sources; (3) whether the
public interest in receiving the information can only be protected via receipt
of the trade-secret information; and (4) whether the public could suffer
injury to their health or safety if the information is not released to the
government. This could mean, for instance, that the black box encryption
code may not be deemed necessary if there are other means to determine
which vehicles contained black boxes independent of providing the
encryption code to the government.
3. Court Balances Need Versus Potential Injury
Satisfied that the requested information qualifies for trade-secret
protection, the court must ultimately balance the government's showing of
relevance and need against the trade-secret owner's claim of injury that
could result if disclosure is compelled. 25 3 In considering the government's
need for the information, the court could factor in who the requestor is and
the purpose for which the information is sought. None of the existing
approaches pay particular attention to these questions, but they could add
value when dealing with trade-secret cases. Assume the NHTSA requests
Toyota's black box because it believes the electronic components of the
black box are interfering with the electronic sensors of the gas pedals and
causing uncontrolled acceleration of the vehicles. 254 This may suggest that
the potential harm to the public from not identifying and correcting the
250. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., Snowden ex ret Victor v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 136 F.R.D. 694, 698 (D. Kan.
igg1) (assessing necessity and considering whether the information sought is available
elsewhere).
253. See Echostar Commc'ns Corp. v. News Corp., 18o F.R.D. 391, 394 (D. Colo. 1998)
(finding that in discovery matter courts must balance need for disclosure of the trade secret
against potential injury from disclosure).
254. This could contrast with a situation where the information is sought by an agency for a
purpose that could directly benefit the company's competitor or another party who has no
incentive to protect the secrecy of the information.
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situation is so grave that disclosure would serve the public interest. A further
consideration may be whether the trade-secret information is critical to the
government or the public. If not, perhaps the company can comply without
disclosing the specific trade secret. If yes, then disclosure with greater
assurance of protection might be advisable, possibly ordering, for instance,
that the information is outside the agency's discretion to disclose or that it
be "sealed."
Moreover, the court could also consider the nature of the trade secret
in evaluating need and risk of injury. Because trade secrets can be virtually
any kind of business information255 it may matter whether the information
sought is the secret formula to the company's core product, or a list of the
company's customers; the encryption code to the black box, or the record of
drivers' braking patterns during an unintended-acceleration incident.
The shelf life of the information could also be considered to determine
whether the nature of the information is such that it will no longer be secret
after a short period of time. It could, for instance, be a marketing-related
secret that will be divulged or reverse-engineered after a product is
released.25 6 In that situation, the court may lean toward not ordering
disclosure, since the requestor will likely have access to the information by
legitimate means in a relatively short period of time. This assumes, however,
that there is no immediate critical need for the information.
Whether the trade-secret owner can persuade the court of the harm
that could result if the trade secret is ordered disclosed is a very important
part of the balance that the court must aim to achieve. The scope of harm,
whether limited to that by a competitor, for instance, compared to a more
widespread public harm, may matter. However, defining harm can be
difficult. The risk of harm is an important component of this evaluation and
could be influenced by the government's assurances of safeguarding the
trade secret. This would also be consistent with the National Parks analysis in
the reverse-FOIA cases that requires consideration of whether disclosure
would cause substantial harm to the submitter's competitive position.25 7
Besides harm to the company, the court may also consider harm to the
public if the information is not produced to the government. This would
therefore allow for those circumstances where the health and safety of the
public are so threatened that disclosure should be compelled. In other
words, the harm to the public would outweigh any competitive harm that
255. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Act § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
256. See, e.g., Dorel Juvenile Grp., Inc. v. DiMartinis, 495 F-3 d 500, 502 (7th Cir. 2007)
(discussing brand positioning strategies that change, evolve, and tied to products that would
become public as having a short shelf life as a trade secret).
257. See Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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the proprietor of the trade secret may suffer.5 8 As recognized under the
takings principles, the government's use of information for the public good
(with adequate compensation) would not likely violate constitutional
norms.2 59 Accordingly, a court in its discretion could order disclosure in
those circumstances.
4. Court Determines Scope of Order
After weighing the various considerations, a court could find that
production of the trade secret should not be ordered. This will end the
inquiry and the trade-secret owner prevails. On the other hand, if the court
determines that production should be compelled, then the delicate task of
crafting an appropriate protective order will remain.26 0 A court should not
compel production of a trade secret without a protective order and
appropriate safeguards for protection of the secret.26,
The court could choose from a range of options, depending on the
particular case, to determine the appropriate scope of the order. For
instance, limited disclosure could be ordered, such that the government may
not receive the entire trade secret, but part of it. This does not appear to be
the current scheme under FOIA, which is an all-or-nothing approach.26 2
Thus, there could be a middle-ground approach, one that would meet the
requestor's need for the information while still protecting the trade-secret
owner's interests. A mosaic approach might also work, where the trade-
secret information is disaggregated such that the disaggregated form does
not reveal the trade secret, yet it remains valuable information to the
requestor. The FTC rules, for instance, provide for the disclosure of
disaggregated information to other agencies,263 and to the extent the secret
information can be segregated from the nonsecret information, a portion of
258. See Lyndon, supra note 7, at 44 ("While one is entitled to the fruits of one's labors, one
is not entitled to injure others with them.").
259. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1020 (1984) (holding that trade secrets
are property under state law and are protected from uncompensated disclosure by the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment); see also Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F-3 d 24, 45-46 (ist
Cir. 2002) (citing Monsanto to conclude that a Massachusetts statute effected a taking of
tobacco companies' trade secrets); Janka, supra note 51, at 338-39, 343-44 (discussing
Monsanto and public use).
260. See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F-3 d 772, 787 (3 d Cir. 1994) ("Courts ...
have a great deal of flexibility in crafting the contents of protective orders to minimize the
negative consequences of disclosure and serve the public interest simultaneously.").
261. See Rowe, supra note 24, at 1451 (discussing safeguards for trade secrets in the course
of litigation).
262. SeeYeager v. DEA, 678 F.2d 315. 322-23 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (reasoning that FOIA does
not require agency to modify exempt information so that it can be produced to requester).
263. 15 U.S.C. § 5 7 b-2(d)(1)(D) (2oo6).
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the record may be disclosed to a FOIA requestor.264 In some circumstances,
a court could order disclosure contingent upon some payment to the trade-
secret owner. This would be akin to a compulsory license where, for
instance, the court has deemed that withholding the information from the
public will have an injurious effect on the public welfare.265
B. BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE FRAMEWORK
This shield-or-disclose model can be useful, in whole or in part, to
virtually all cases where a court must decide whether to compel production
of trade secrets. As discussed earlier,266 the current approaches to the other
categories of cases that often implicate trade-secret production can all be
improved. For instance, in the private-party cases involving discovery
disputes and in the government cases, courts ought to focus more on the
threshold determination of whether a protectable trade secret exists. It
seems logical that where a party is claiming trade-secret protection to shield
information under the discovery rules, or any other rules, that the
information in question must meet the definition of a trade secret.267
Otherwise, the protections of trade secrecy status should not attach. Courts
should therefore pay closer attention to that threshold requirement.
In general, the cases can all benefit from courts giving greater scrutiny
to trade-secret analysis in these cases, rather than overlooking it. Moreover,
the model, while explored in relation to the federal government, can be
used with state-government refusal-to-submit cases as well. Most states have
FOIA-type disclosure statutes that would implicate the very same issues and
considerations that have been addressed here, and from which the proposal
was crafted.
Further research could also examine whether this model, or a modified
version, should be incorporated within the agencies' regulations governing
the treatment of confidential business information. This could provide
greater consistency for agency evaluations of FOIA requests for trade-secret
information. More generally, it may also serve to harmonize and make more
uniform the current patchwork of agency regulations regarding trade secrets
in the hands of the government. Finally, it may also be worth considering
264. 16 C.F.R. § 1015.19(a) (2010). The SEC regulations also provide that "any reasonably
segregable portion of a record shall be provided ... after deletion of the portions which are
considered nonpublic." 17 C.F.R. 200.80(b) (2010).
265. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do
Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 953 (2oo6) (discussing proposed
standard under which Congress may consider exemptions to patent infringement).
266. See discussion supra Part III.B.
267. See Centurion Indus., Inc. v. Warren Steurer & Assocs., 665 F.2d 323, 325 (1oth Cir.
g81) ("To resist discovery under Rule 26(c)(7), a person must first establish that the
information sought is a trade secret. . . .").
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the value of infusing some of the elements of this model to reverse-FOIA
reviews under the APA.26 8
Finally, beyond the doctrine and the courts, this Article has also
identified a larger structural problem among the agencies. The lack of
uniform standards among the various agencies in dealing with trade secrets
also suggests that the practice on the ground in handling trade secrets on a
day-to-day basis may also be unsound and inconsistent. Ultimately, both the
theory and practice need to be better aligned to protect trade-secret
principles. How best to achieve that feat, however, is a complicated question,
the resolution of which is beyond the scope of this Article. Various options
could be explored. Perhaps a trade-secret department within each agency
could be one configuration or an overarching trade-secret department for
all the agencies overseen by an intellectual property czar could be another.
In future work, I plan to analyze how an effective scheme relating to agency
practice and procedure might be structured. For now, however, the shield-
or-disclose model is aimed at the courts.
V. CONCLUSION
Refusal-to-submit cases raise some delicate issues on both sides since the
interests of all involved parties must be given very serious consideration.
While these cases will necessarily be decided on a case-by-case basis, an
approach that takes into account trade-secrecy principles, in addition to a
more structured approach to government-disclosure policies, will better
achieve the balance between secrecy and access. It will also allow for the
crafting of more creative solutions that are better able to serve the needs of
the respective parties. The shield-or-disclose model presented here helps
meet those ideals by making clear the parties' burdens of proof on showing
harm, relevance, and need before trade secrets are to be handed over to the
government. Ultimately, it provides a more balanced, more specifically
tailored approach that offers more of a middle-ground solution than
currently exists.
268. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
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